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Whiteness as Contract
Marissa Jackson Sow*
Abstract
2020 forced scholars, policymakers, and activists alike to
grapple with the impact of “twin pandemics”—the COVID-19
pandemic, which has devastated Black and Indigenous
communities, and the scourge of structural and physical state
violence against those same communities—on American society.
As atrocious acts of anti-Black violence and harassment by law
enforcement officers and white civilians are captured on
recording devices, the gap between Black people’s human and
civil rights and their living conditions has become readily
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apparent. Less visible human rights abuses camouflaged as
private commercial matters, and thus out of the reach of the state,
are also increasingly exposed as social and financial inequalities
have become ever starker. These abuses are not effectively
reached by antidiscrimination law, leaving Black and
Indigenous people with rights, but no remedies, as they are forced
to navigate a degraded existence suspended somewhere between
citizen and foreigner, and more importantly, between life and
death.
In analyzing the persistence, resilience, and agility of white
supremacy in the United States, this Article proposes a departure
from reliance on the extant antidiscrimination legal frameworks
in the United States. The Article offers a theory of whiteness as
contract, providing scholars, activists, and movement lawyers
with a new prism of analysis for the structural and physical
violence that those raced as Black endure at the express direction
of the state. Despite federal law formally establishing racial
equality with respect to citizenship—and with citizenship, the
rights to contract and to property—an invisible common law sets
forth that Black people are not in privity with the state and lack
contractual capacity with the white body politic or its individual
members. Under the terms of this contract for whiteness, for
which those raced as white have bargained, Black people lack
capacity to negotiate, occupy, or exercise a reliable authority over
property. Moreover, whenever Black people are found to be in
trespass on white property, they have no expectation of physical
integrity, liberty, or life—or of remedies for breaches thereof.
An end to anti-Black state violence requires revoking the
terms of whiteness and instituting a new social contract that
accords Black people full political personhood and full
citizenship, complete with full contracting capacity and
authority, and full protection of their contracts and
proprietorship. Scholars and advocates committed to ending
structural and physical anti-Black brutality may use the new
analytical prism proposed in this Article to explore new advocacy
strategies and to consider meaningful racial justice remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2020, Vauhxx Booker went to Lake Monroe, some
sixty miles south of Indianapolis, Indiana, to watch the lunar
eclipse with a group of friends.1 At some point during his visit,
a group of white men accused Booker, a Black civil rights
activist in the Bloomington area and a member of the Monroe
County Human Rights Commission, and his friends of
trespassing upon private property.2 According to Booker, he and
his friends apologized, but the men—one of whom was wearing
a hat featuring a Confederate flag—set upon him and assaulted
him.3 The assault was partially captured on video by a group of
bystanders, and the video shows the men surrounding Booker
and pinning him against a tree while he and the bystanders
pleaded for him to be left alone.4 The video captures the men
shouting explicitly racist language at Booker and berating him
for fraternizing with “five white friends.”5 Booker later reported
that the men called for someone to bring a noose, and Booker
sustained a number of injuries, including a concussion and
having his hair ripped out.6 The police responded to the incident
but declined to arrest Booker’s attackers.7 Booker commented
on his assault later that evening, characterizing the assault as
an “attempted lynching.”8 The FBI announced an investigation
into the violent assault days later.9
1. See Johnny Diaz, F.B.I. to Investigate Case of Black Man Pinned by
White Man in Indiana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/9CJGRYEA.
2. See Meagan Flynn, Black Activist Says He Was Victim of “Attempted
Lynching” by White Group in Incident Partially Caught on Video, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/ES9Q-CR38 (detailing the assault of Vauhxx
Booker and including a video that captures a portion of the incident).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Diaz, supra note 1.
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Outrage following Booker’s attempted lynching was swift:
local officials condemned the attack, and protesters assembled
on Monday, July 6, 2020, outside of the Monroe County
Courthouse in support of Booker.10 During the protest, however,
the driver of a red vehicle accelerated into the crowd of
protesters,11 contributing to a trend by civilians and law
enforcement agents of using their vehicles as weapons against
civil rights protesters.12 After the attempted lynching, Booker
joined a most unfortunate cohort of Black people who became
the victims of America’s racist violence for the offense of being
alive and present in the wrong place at the wrong time.13 He is
fortunate to have survived, and he is even more fortunate that
so many other people witnessed his attack, and that at least one
of those people captured a portion of the vicious assault on
camera for the rest of the world to witness as well.14
2020 cast a bright light on the stark difference in the
realities of life and death between white and Black people in the
United States. While global uprisings have directly responded
to anti-Black state violence captured on recording devices, other
10. Flynn, supra note 2.
11. Id.; see also Jacey Fortin, Indiana Woman Is Accused of Driving into
Demonstrators, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/QA5G-PWF8
(reporting that a sixty-six-year-old woman was captured on video driving her
vehicle into protesters and was arrested and charged with two felony counts
of criminal recklessness, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in serious bodily injury).
12. See Ray Levy Uyeda, Over 60 People Have Driven Their Cars into
BLM Protesters Since May, MIC (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/QU5J-922J
(reporting that at least sixty-eight people drove vehicles into Black Lives
Matter protesters between May 25, 2020 and July 9, 2020); Alex Ward, People
are Running Over George Floyd Protesters. Are Far-Right Memes to Blame?,
VOX (June 1, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://perma.cc/8CPE-B354 (describing
University of Chicago research director Ari Weill’s theory that far-right
memes are encouraging civilians and law enforcement officers to plow their
vehicles into crowds of racial justice protesters).
13. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Hate Crimes Rose in 2020 with
Jumps in Racially Motivated Incidents, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2021, 7:41 PM)
https://perma.cc/772F-FLKZ (describing the increase in racially-motivated
crimes, specifically highlighting a 40 percent rise in anti-Black violence in
2020).
14. See Joshua Nevett, George Floyd: The Personal Cost of Filming Police
Brutality, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/T44E-3JY7 (describing
the movement to hold police accountable for acts of brutality by recording such
incidents and identifying the recording of the 1992 beating of Rodney King as
the movement’s original catalyst).
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widespread, but less publicly visible, human rights abuses
against Black people have denigrated their qualities of life to a
state suspended between life and death. Days after Vauhxx
Booker escaped with his life in Indiana, a team of attorneys with
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan brought
suit in federal court in Detroit, demanding a permanent end to
the water shutoff program under which Detroiters suffered for
nearly seven years.15 In Detroit, where monthly water and
sewage bills can exceed $150, over 140,000 Detroiters had their
water disconnected from 2014 until March 2020.16 Shortly
before the first cases of COVID-19 were recorded in Michigan in
March 2020, the governor’s office refused to intervene in the
water shutoff program, noting that it had no reason to believe
that the lack of running water posed a health emergency.17
Evidence shows that Detroit’s Blackest neighborhoods were
most impacted by the shutoffs, and that a positive correlation
exists between zip codes with the most shutoffs and the most
cases of COVID-19.18
The most obvious and prevalent approaches to addressing
these anecdotes is through the prism of rights.19 In Booker’s
case, the matter is criminal and, therefore, a matter of public
concern, even though the defense asserted by his attackers is
that he was trespassing upon private land while on his way to
the lake.20 Should Booker wish to advance a civil rights
complaint, he will need to prove that he was attacked because of
15. See Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 18–20, Taylor v. City of Detroit,
No. 2:20-cv-11860-SDD-APP, 2020 WL 3883610 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2020)
[hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
16. See id. ¶ 4.
17. See id. ¶¶ 71–74; Christine Ferretti, State: “Insufficient” Data to
Support Ban on Water Shutoffs in Detroit, DET. NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020, 3:39 PM),
https://perma.cc/838A-GHH7; Caroline Llanes, Whitmer Will Not Use
Executive Powers to End Detroit Water Shutoffs, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2020,
4:09 PM), https://perma.cc/8WLH-988A.
18. See Detroit Water Shutoffs Led to More COVID-19 Cases, WLNS (July
9, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://perma.cc/4BBM-PSCD.
19. See Janneke Gerards, The Prism of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 173, 178–79 (2012) (describing the “prism-like character” of
fundamental rights, where one specific right may implicate a broad spectrum
of tangential interests).
20. See Michael Levenson & Johnny Diaz, 2 White Men Charged After
Helping Pin Black Man to a Tree in Indiana, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (July
17, 2020), https://perma.cc/UJJ9-TYX2.
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his race or other protected status.21 Because of the presence of
video, he may be able to meet the standard of proof—a difficult
accomplishment in a country where proving racial
discrimination in a court of law is notoriously difficult and less
than 2 percent of civil rights referrals to the Department of
Justice are prosecuted.22
Both local and federal governments have reminded the
people of the City of Detroit that they do not enjoy a right to
water;23 rather water is a commodity that must be paid for.24
However, a right to water is firmly recognized by the
international human rights system.25 Moreover, it is undeniable
that human beings cannot live without water even when they
are not threatened by a deadly virus mitigated by diligent hand
washing. Reflecting attempts to privatize Detroit’s water

21. See James Morsch, Comment, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes:
The Argument Against Presumptions of Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 659, 660 (1992) (explaining how hate crime statutes typically
require proving that the defendant “assaulted, harassed, or intimidated
another person” on the basis of that person’s race, religion, or national origin).
22. See Justin Hansford & Meena Jagannath, Ferguson to Geneva: Using
the Human Rights Framework to Push Forward a Vision for Racial Justice in
the United States After Ferguson, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 121, 130
(2015) (“Nevertheless, DOJ investigations do not guarantee a prosecution,
regardless of its findings, and research has shown that between 1986 and
2003, less than 2% of federal civil rights referrals to the DOJ were actually
prosecuted.”).
23. See Amanda Klasing, Water Is a Human Right—in Flint, in Michigan,
and the US, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 11, 2018, 6:27 PM),
https://perma.cc/R7KP-NR9R
The US government and its state and municipal authorities have
stubbornly refused to acknowledge people’s right to water. In 2014,
a US federal judge in Michigan ruled that there was “no enforceable
right” to water after the city of Detroit started massive shutoffs of
household water supplies if people did not pay their water bill.
24. See Michelle Miller, Detroit Water Shut-Offs Bring U.N. Scrutiny,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:05 PM), https://perma.cc/9LH8-MPXY (quoting
Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan’s Chief of Staff as saying, “At the end of the day,
everybody’s gotta pay their water bill”); see also Robert Snell & Steve Pardo,
Judge Won’t Stop Shutoffs, Says No Right to Free Water, DET. NEWS (Sep. 29,
2014, 12:10 PM), https://perma.cc/S7CK-J36F (quoting Federal Bankruptcy
Judge Steven Rhodes as saying, of the argument that a right to water exists
in Detroit, “There is no such right or law . . . . The last thing [Detroit] needs is
this hit to its revenues”).
25. See G.A. Res. 70/169, at 1 (Dec. 17, 2015); G.A. Res. 64/292, at 2 (July
28, 2010).
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authority, and the ongoing commodification of water in the
City,26 the rights-focused arguments for restoration of water
services in Detroit have not yet prevailed in the courts.27
Notwithstanding the strength of the case the ACLU brought on
behalf of Detroiters, a federal judge has found that the City of
Detroit has a lawful interest in collecting on outstanding water
bills.28
At the core of these anecdotes is the question of the right
and ability of Black people in the United States to traverse,
possess, or enjoy property. Enjoyment of the right to property is
a core benefit of American citizenship and of American
personhood.29 This Article uses contract theory to explain why
Black people’s possession of property—including their rights to
home ownership and life-sustaining utilities, their rights to
personal physical integrity, their rights to cast votes, and their
rights to existence in a public space—is regularly met with
brutal resistance. In articulating a theory of personhood in
which Black people are stripped of contractual capacity and the
rights to political, commercial, or personal proprietorship, I
explain how grave, anti-Black human rights abuses are
tolerated and sanctioned within the United States.
Governments escape liability for such abuses by promoting a
formal legal contract under which all American citizens are
entitled to the equal protection of the law while supporting
private ordering under which the terms of whiteness are met.
Cheryl Harris has described whiteness as property.30 This
Article sets forth the theory of whiteness as contract; or,
whiteness as property that is bargained-for. The Article’s
central argument is that whiteness is the product of
26. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 42.
27. See Lyda v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 841 F.3d 684, 700
(6th Cir. 2016) (stating that the list of fundamental rights is limited, and that
there is no fundamental right to water service).
28. See id. at 701 (explaining that maintaining a financially stable
municipal entity is a valid governmental purpose and that substantive due
process only requires that the city’s policy be “rationally related” to said
governmental purpose).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived
of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”).
30. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1715–16 (1993).
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contracting—both commercial and social—that creates, and
continues to negotiate, an invisible common law that preserves
control over property, capital, power, and contracting authority
for those raced as white. The contract’s goals are primarily
economic, relying upon the expropriation of Indigenous land and
the exploitation of Black labor on the expropriated land.31 This
Article explores the use of commercial contracting by the state,
as well as the state’s interference with commercial contracting
by Black people, as a way of maintaining and consolidating the
benefits of whiteness guaranteed by white social contracting.
To test the theory, I focus on the twin performance
mechanisms of whiteness: structural and physical brutality.32
The violence against Black people in the United States should
not be regarded as a failure of democracy’s engineering but as
evidence of its flawless operation. We should instead regard
water shutoff programs and land grab policies, along with the
scourge of anti-Black police brutality and vigilante harassment,
as sophisticated mechanisms for repairing breaches—real or
perceived—to the terms of whiteness. This Article makes the
case that what appears to be a gap in legal protections is
actually where the terms of whiteness are written in an
“invisible ink,”33 negotiating and maintaining a sociopolitical
and economic order that places Black and Indigenous people
outside of the law, outside of personhood, and—as
necessary—outside of property, via displacement, dispossession,
disenfranchisement, or death.
In this Article, I focus primarily on people of African descent
who are raced as Black in the United States and secondarily on
First Nations or Indigenous American peoples. I do so for the
purpose of establishing a case study of how whiteness works,
and not to exclude or erase the experience of Latinx, Middle
Eastern and North African, or Asian and Pacific Islander
31. See id. (identifying the construction of race as a means of
expropriating Black labor and Indigenous land).
32. This is a departure from the theory of the Racial Contract, discussed
in Part I. The Racial Contract describes the tools of “physical violence and
ideological conditioning”—“the two traditional weapons of coercion”—as chief
performance mechanisms. CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 83 (1997)
[hereinafter MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT].
33. Adam Serwer, The Coronavirus Was an Emergency Until Trump
Found Out Who Was Dying, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/D6TYSFKE.
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communities, who also endure the burdens of being raced as
non-white in the United States. Because Blackness is
constructed in opposition to whiteness in the United States,
focusing on the experiences of Black people’s exclusion from
America’s social contract provides for a prototypical case study.
Moreover, the oppositional constructions of whiteness and
Blackness ensure that anti-Blackness is universal. Non-Black
people of color along with people of color who are of African
descent (who may or may not identify as Black) know that
proximity to whiteness comes with greater access to the rights
discussed in this Article, and that proximity to Blackness comes
with greater exclusion from them.34 For that reason, focusing on
Black people is actually the best way to test the theories this
Article proffers.
I define Indigenous peoples as those nations and
communities of people who were the earliest inhabitants of the
Americas. Indigenous American peoples are not a race, but
rather nations of people who have been racialized and who, like
other peoples, have been raced.35 The Article recognizes that the
term “Indigenous” is limiting insofar as all peoples are
indigenous to one place or another. For the purposes of this
Article, however, and with respect to the Americas, I use an
expansive definition of “Indigenous” that is inclusive of First
Nations’ Americans, Indigenous Amazonian Brazilians, and
Latinx peoples from Central and South America with recent and
significant Indigenous ancestry. I recognize that individual
people to whom my definitions of Blackness or whiteness may
apply may also be Latinx or Indigenous, and I also acknowledge
that people may be Black and Indigenous at once, and that
mixed European ancestry is also a part of the Black and
Indigenous experience. Such is the nature of race and race-ing.
I use an expansive definition of Blackness that includes all
peoples having sub-Saharan African ancestry, acknowledging
that African peoples are themselves “indigenous” to the African
continent and come from nations and sovereign empires with
34. See Janice Gassam Asare, How Communities of Color Perpetuate
Anti-Blackness, FORBES (July 19, 2020, 11:26 PM) https://perma.cc/DH9CY8G5.
35. See, e.g., Vikas Gampa et al., Racialization as a Barrier to Achieving
Health Equity for Native Americans, 22 AMA J. ETHICS 874, 874 (2020),
https://perma.cc/4BET-CHFB (PDF).
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long and important precolonial histories. This definition is
intentionally inclusive of people commonly known as “Hispanic,”
“Latino,” or “Latinx” who hail from the Caribbean region and
Central and South America, including, but not limited to, people
of partial, significant, or predominant African descent from
Brazil, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. This definition
of Blackness can include people raced as “colored” in South
Africa, for example, or people of mixed Indo- and
Afro-descendant ancestry in Guyana, Jamaica, or Trinidad. It
similarly acknowledges Afro-descendant communities in Arab
states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, in South Asia,
and in the Pacific.
In Part I of the Article, I establish the theory of whiteness
as contract. I also articulate a theory of race and personhood
that establishes Black people as third-party beneficiaries of this
contract
under
the
most
favorable
circumstances,
subcontractors under other circumstances, and as trespassers in
the least favorable (and most life-threatening) cases, due to
their subordinated status as natural beings devoid of politics. In
Part II, I set forth the terms of the contract, including terms of
performance and provisions for remedying breach. Part III
applies the theory of whiteness as contract to the following case
studies: the water shutoff and mortgage foreclosure scandals in
Detroit, Michigan; the civil settlements and criminal
investigations relating to the Flint water scandal; and Byron
Allen’s lawsuit against Comcast Corporation for racial
discrimination under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.36
Part IV discusses social and political action as a meaningful
path toward the revocation of the contract of whiteness and
reparative justice for Black people in the United States.
I. RECOGNIZING THE CONTRACT
In this Part of the Article, I establish a theory of how
whiteness and, by opposition, non-whiteness (and particularly
Blackness) is constructed, and for what social, political, legal,
and economic purposes. In doing so, I articulate theories of
relationships between whiteness and American citizenship,
whiteness and the state, and contracts and the state that
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see generally Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
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simultaneously center both social contracting and commercial
contracting. I, therefore, intentionally run afoul of extant legal
frameworks and prevalent thinking concerning the proper
placement of contract theory and the utility of both American
and international antidiscrimination law in the fight to
dismantle systematic and structural racism. A major objective
of this Article is to disabuse scholars of the idea that contract
theory is only useful and applicable in the private sector: by
characterizing the state as the negotiated product of the body
politic, which contracts among itself the terms of political
personhood,
citizenship,
privileges,
and
rights;
by
demonstrating the extent to which state actors intentionally
facilitate and perpetuate racial contract negotiation, formation,
and performance; and by highlighting the role that the law and
law enforcement continue to play in undergirding and giving
explicit force to racial contracting, even when such contracting
is not valid per classical contract theory, or otherwise tangible
or legally enforceable.
To establish this theory, I use as a point of departure the
seminal works of two renowned scholars in the fields of
philosophy and law—Charles Mills’s theory of the Racial
Contract37 and Cheryl Harris’s theory of whiteness as
property.38 These works, by themselves, mete out devastating
blows to the idea that contracts are private affairs that are not
impacted, and not to be impacted, by race or politics. They also
undermine the prevalent belief among lawyers that
constitutions, and laws more broadly, are not contracts.39
Having firmly established that race is a sociopolitical
37. See generally MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32.
38. See generally Harris, supra note 30.
39. There exists a longstanding debate among legal scholars over whether
contract theory may be applicable to constitutions. For example, critics point
out that unlike most contracts, constitutions are not enforced by a third party.
See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charter, in
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 182, 184 (Denis J.
Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013), https://perma.cc/N3F8-AL5H (PDF).
More fundamentally, “[t]he social contract that many political theorists have
presented as the conceptual foundation of political society seems, from the
viewpoint of an Anglo-American lawyer, to be a very poor excuse for a contract,
indeed, one that can be considered a contractual relationship only by a
strenuous exercise of the imagination.” Joseph H. Kary, Contract Law and the
Social Contract: What Legal History Can Teach Us About the Political Theory
of Hobbes and Locke, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 73, 75 (1999).
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construction meant to consolidate economic wealth and power
amongst those people raced as white and that this construction
is bargained-for, I turn to the work of personhood scholars to
build my sub-theories. The first proffers the rights to property
and contracting authority as the preserves of whiteness and as
verboten or otherwise severely curtailed for Black
people—preventing Black people from being able to rely on
privity with the state, and therefore preventing Black people
from enjoying a reliable right to own, possess, or be present on,
any property therein. The second posits that Black people are
therefore constructed out of full humanity, citizenship, and even
a reliable expectation of life and physical safety, reduced within
society to a status of tenancy when their presence (and labor and
capital) is required, and otherwise regarded as squatters and
trespassers.
A. The Benefit of the Bargain: Negotiating Whiteness and its
Perks
In early July 2020, a Mississippi state elections
commissioner, Gail Welch, posted via Facebook that she was
concerned about a potential increase in Black voter registration
and turnout.40 Welch said, “I’m concerned about voter
registration in Mississippi . . . . The blacks are having lots [of]
events for voter registration. People in Mississippi have to get
involved, too.”41 Her post went viral and she was rapidly
condemned for her remarks.42 Welch claimed that her remarks
were meant to be private and that they were not racist.43 Welch
also claimed that she meant to encourage and not suppress voter
turnout; indeed, she explicitly called for white voter
mobilization so that Black people in Mississippi, whose interests
apparently conflict with the interests of white people in
Mississippi, would not obtain electoral victory.44

40. Lici Beveridge, Mississippi Election Commissioner’s Social Media
Comment About Black Voters Causes Uproar, CLARION LEDGER (June 30, 2020,
8:38 AM), https://perma.cc/ZJW3-5686.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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Welch’s horror at Black people’s exercise of their voting
rights is shockingly inconsistent with the formal values of a
liberal democracy,45 and certainly raises questions about her
fitness as an elections commissioner. Equally remarkable about
her commentary is the fact that it is a candid, full-throated
articulation of the democracy’s invisible, informal values—that
Black gain (of franchise and political capital, in this case) is
white loss.46 Her comments are more remarkable still because
they also articulate, quite casually and in print, Welch’s view of
personhood.47 In Mississippi, according to Welch, there are “the
Blacks” and then there are “people,” by which she means “white
people.”48
Mills’s contract relies upon two primary formation and
enforcement mechanisms also implicitly encompassed by
Harris’s theory of whiteness as property: ideological
conditioning and brutality.49 Both scholars acknowledge that
the creation of race is a mechanism of delegating privilege and
power to some while withholding it from others, which was made
possible via the development of ideology justifying the forcible
seizure of land; the abduction, sale, and enslavement of
generations of Afro-descendant human beings; and the
massacres of Indigenous nations.50 The order established by the
combination of ideological conditioning and brutal force are
what is commonly known as white supremacy, and what I refer
to throughout this Article—using the language of contract—as
the terms of whiteness.

45.
46.

See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
See CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR
RACIAL DIVIDE 4–6 (2016) (“The trigger for white rage, inevitably, is black
advancement.”).
47. See Beveridge, supra note 40.
48. See id.
49. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 83.
50. See id. at 82–83 (asserting that the racial state functions to safeguard
“white-dominated policy” through physical violence and enslavement); Harris,
supra note 34, at 1716 (“The origins of property rights in the United States are
rooted in racial domination. Even in the early years of the country, it was not
the concept of race alone that operated to oppress Blacks and Indians; rather,
it was the interaction between conceptions of race and property . . . .”).
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The Racial Contract in U.S. Law: A Construction of Caste
and Power

Ta-Nehisi Coates has said that race is “the child of racism
and not the father.”51 Race is a social construct, but it is equally,
and more consequentially, a legal construct. The theory of
whiteness as contract is the theory of an invisible contract,
under which Black Americans exist and are policed and
governed. Mills understands this contract to be:
[A] set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements
between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth
designated . . . as white, and coextensive . . . with the class of
full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans
as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and inferior moral status,
sub-persons, so that they have a subordinate civil
standing . . . .52

A common retort to the presentation of the theory of the
Racial Contract is that the Racial Contract is not a real contract,
but rather a metaphor based in the theory of social contracting.53
Those who offer such rejoinders generally do not believe that
social contracts are real, limiting their definition of real
contracts to those tangible agreements which are enforceable
under the law.54 Other critics will make the case that statutes
and constitutions are a “poor excuse”55 not just for contracts, but
even for social contracts, as they do not represent the consent of

51. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 7 (2015).
52. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 11.
53. See Gregory Slack, From Class to Race and Back Again: A Critique of
Charles Mills’ Black Radical Liberalism, 84 SCI. & SOC’Y 67, 68 (2020),
https://perma.cc/UG3W-S8HA (PDF)
The whole point of The Racial Contract was to first apply the
metaphor of the class/domination contract from Rousseau’s
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in order to reveal the historical
reality of a racial contract to subordinate nonwhites on a global
scale, and then to reintroduce the liberal social contract story of
truly free and equal citizens coming together to forge a just society
as a normative yardstick.
54. See Paul Lermack, The Constitution Is the Social Contract so It Must
Be a Contract . . . Right? A Critique of Originalism as Interpretive Method, 33
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1405 n.8 (2007).
55. Kary, supra note 39, at 75.
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all citizens.56 But Mills’s theory of the Racial Contract is more
than a metaphor: Mills discusses a real social contract that
creates and employs race to establish and enforce an economic
order, and which has at times and in places been enforceable as
public, codified law and which has also been enforced within the
private and public sectors alike via traditional commercial
contracting.57 Social contracting is of intrinsic value when
discussing the rights of and relating to property, as the
regulation of property is a central goal of social contract theory.58
Under the Racial Contract, all of the negotiating parties are
those whose consent matters: those people, raced as white, to
whom political personhood and contractual capacity is
attributed and who demonstrate their assent to the contracting
process by performing the Contract per its terms.59 The concrete
consequences of this social contracting for Black people are real,
and therefore Black theory concerning the role of social and
commercial transacting in the perpetuation of race and
racism—which are necessarily disruptive of “classical”
knowledge—matters.60 Like Mills, I seek to decolonize social
56. See Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 185 (“[A] geographically dispersed
ethnic or political minority may have no effective opportunity to secede and so
may be effectively coerced to join the constitutional order without either
explicit or implicit consent. For such citizens, the contract metaphor runs
out . . . .”).
57. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 9–11.
58. Rosseau, Locke, Hobbes, and Kant all used social contract theory to
advance theories of property rights and citizenship, thus establishing a
relationship between property rights and citizenship. See Elisabeth Ellis,
Citizenship and Property Rights: A New Look at Social Contract Theory, 68 J.
POL. 544, 555 (2006), https://perma.cc/XCK3-WPBH (PDF) (“The social
contract idea remains the basis of contemporary democratic politics; particular
theories of property rights and citizen capacity have continuing relevance only
insofar as they promote contractarian freedom under prevailing social
circumstances.”); Paul Seabright et al., Evaluating Social Contract Theory in
the Light of Evolutionary Social Science, EVOLUTIONARY HUM. SCIS. (Ruth
Mace ed., 2021), https://perma.cc/E85B-BBJH (PDF) (discussing the
similarities between the social contract theories of Hobbes and Rosseau).
59. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 11–12 (“[T]he
Racial Contract is not a contract to which the nonwhite subset of humans can
be a genuinely consenting party. . . . Rather, it is contract between those
characterized as white over the nonwhites, who are the objects rather than the
subjects of the agreement.”).
60. See id. at 13–14
[T]he Racial contract establishes a racial polity, a racial state, and
a racial juridical system, where the status of whites and nonwhites
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contract theory by applying it to the bargain for whiteness.
However, I also assert the applicability of classical contract
theory to the construction and negotiation of whiteness and
non-whiteness and contend that social and commercial
contracting serve each other in maintaining the terms of
whiteness as property, as personhood, and as power.
A key contribution of Mills’s theory of the racial contract is
its contextualization, if not outright repudiation, of key aspects
of Rawls’s idealistic social contract.61 As with so many other
critiques of Rawls’s social contract theory, Mills’s theory reveals
that Rawls’s ideals—including his veil of ignorance—are no
match for human realities such as power and special interests
such as racial identity.62 Rawls, of course, envisioned a fair
society devoid of inequality of any type.63 He realized that this
society did not exist, but he believed it was attainable.64 Indeed,
Rawls’s theory of justice envisions a society for which many
Americans—and especially non-white Americans—persistently
lobby. Accounting for the reality of race requires the
decolonization of social contract theory—this means recognizing
that the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls are
themselves the products of Western philosophical tradition and,
therefore, the products of thinkers who existed (and whose
thinking is highly valorized) because they were Western and

is clearly demarcated by law or custom. And the purpose of this
state, by contrast with the neutral state of classical
contractarianism, is, inter alia, specifically to maintain and
reproduce this racial order, securing the privileges and advantages
of the full white citizens and maintain the subordination of
nonwhites.
61. See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 302 (setting forth Rawls’s theory of social
contract, in which contracting parties—blind to all demographic
information— agree on principles of justice: the greatest equal liberty possible,
equal opportunity for all offices and positions, and the arrangement of
socioeconomic inequality such that it most benefits the most disadvantaged).
62. See CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE
OF RACIAL LIBERALISM 87 (2017) [hereinafter MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE
WRONGS].
63. See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 12 (describing the original position of
equality as a situation in which “no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status” and “no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the
choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of
social circumstances”).
64. See id. at 12.
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white.65 Secondly, the decolonization of social contract theory
requires the amplification and valorization of thought from
non-white thinkers from colonies or the Global South. Said
another way, Mills’s theory of the social contract is itself
decolonial, and decolonization requires that his theories not be
considered marginal with respect to those of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rawls, but rather centered as a standard—as the warning
warbling of the miner’s canary—by which the theories hailed by
colonizing forces are tested and adjudged.66
The United States’ primary social contract—the United
States Constitution—established the centrality of property
ownership, and necessarily, the right of contract to American
citizenship. Black people were formally excluded from these
rights, and the terms of the Racial Contract were set forth in
law with particular clarity by Justice Taney in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.67 He stated,
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors
were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become
a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and
as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?68

Taney’s answer to his own question was emphatically
negative. It firmly placed Black people outside of the American
political project and franchise. He ruled that American
citizenship would remain perpetually out of reach for people of
African descent, whether enslaved or free:
We think . . . that [Black people] are not included, and were
not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
65. Mills directly confronts Rawls and the white hegemony of political
philosophy in later work, proposing in response to the race-blindness of Rawls
a “black radical liberalism” that is meant to serve as a “radical revision,” which
allows Rawls’s theory to be retrieved for racial justice and repudiates “the
overarching contract myth that the impartial state was consensually created
by reciprocally respecting rights-bearing persons.” MILLS, BLACK
RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 62, at 206–09.
66. See id. at 201 (proposing Black radical liberalism as a means of
decolonizing political theory).
67. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
68. Id. at 403.
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privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at
that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those
who held the power and the Government might choose to
grant them.69

With the formal end of chattel slavery came the period of
Reconstruction, and with Reconstruction came transformational
legislation to formally revoke the racist social contract upon
which the Republic had been founded.70 Notably, the
Constitution’s Three-Fifths Clause, which expressly quantified
Black sub-personhood vis-à-vis white personhood, was replaced
with the Fourteenth Amendment—overturning Dred Scott and
guaranteeing Black Americans (but not Indigenous Americans)
United States citizenship.71 In one of the rare instances in which
whiteness is even mentioned in the United States Code, sections
1981 and 198272 established for non-white people the rights to
make and enforce contracts, and to property, as “enjoyed by
white citizens.”73 This legislation was thorough and clear. For
example, § 1981 elaborates that the term “make or enforce
contracts” includes “the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship”
and that “[t]he rights protected by this section are protected

69. Id. at 404–05.
70. See Nancy Leong, Enjoyed by White Citizens, 109 GEO. L.J. 1421,
1437–39 (2021) (discussing the phrase “enjoyed by white citizens” in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and how that language established an antidiscrimination
standard that allowed local governments “to be evaluated by how they treated
people of color in relation to white people, rather than in any absolute sense”);
see also Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 717, 724 (2011) (explaining that “the post-Civil War amendments and
their application sought to delete the distinction between legal persons and
nonpersons”).
71. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 732–33 (explaining “the constitutional
norm of equality imbedded in the Fourteenth Amendment”).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982.
73. Leong, supra note 70, at 1424–25.
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against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law.”74
Even as antidiscrimination laws sought to reform Western
legal systems, they did little, if anything, to transform the
underlying ideologies of white supremacy and the desire to
dominate material resources that undergird both. The backlash
against Reconstruction-era reforms such as the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 was marked by campaigns of vicious violence,75
including lynchings, massacres, and lootings of Black American
property and assets.76 The signatories to the white supremacist
racial contract viewed antiracist legal reforms as breaches to the
contract and always sought to remedy those breaches via legal,
illegal, and extralegal means.77
After the Civil War, between 1865 and 1885, tens of
thousands of formerly slaveholding American Southerners
moved to Brazil at the enthusiastic invitation of Brazilian
Emperor Dom Pedro II.78 Slavery would remain legal in Brazil
until 1888,79 and Dom Pedro wanted the Americans to bring
with them agricultural techniques for growing cotton.80 Still
more white American Southerners fled to what is now Belize,
but was then British Honduras, forming the Confederate
Settlements in British Honduras.81 The British government sold

74. Id. at 1424 n.13.
75. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1746.
76. See id.
77. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 20–21.
78. See Terrence McCoy, They Lost the Civil War and Fled to Brazil. Their
Descendants Refuse to Take Down the Confederate Flag, WASH. POST (July 11,
2020), https://perma.cc/MKK9-2M3K (explaining that by offering free
transport, cheap land, and easy path to citizenship, Emperor Dom Pedro II
induced the immigration of between 8,000 and 20,000 Southerners following
the Civil War); Simon Romero, A Slice of the Confederacy in the Interior of
Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/4VR8-A72U (discussing
Emperor Dom Pedro II’s alliance with the Confederate States of America
during the Civil War and his efforts to lure white immigrants to Brazil in the
1860s and 1870s).
79. See McCoy, supra note 78.
80. See id.
81. See DONALD C. SIMMONS JR., CONFEDERATE SETTLEMENTS IN BRITISH
HONDURAS 26 (2001) (discussing successful efforts to attract Confederate
settlers to British Honduras); William D. Pederson, Book Review, 21 J. THIRD
WORLD STUDS. 312, 312 (2004) (“As British Honduras, it beckoned thousands

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1823

arms to the Confederate states during the American Civil War,
underscoring yet again the economic and racial interests at play
with respect to the perpetuation of whiteness, particularly
across national and colonial borders.82
Ultimately, as this Article contends, the Racial Contract
has never been revoked. As a social contract, it uses statutory
law, but is not dependent upon it. Signatories to the Contract
viewed the Reconstruction-era legislation as a breach of the
Contract, and they revolted against the attempts at social
transformation: (1) using vicious state-sanctioned white
violence to terrorize and kill Black people;83 (2) simply fleeing to
other territories in hopes of replicating the same racial and
economic order; 84 and (3) replacing de jure racial oppression
with de facto racial subordination.85 The Racial Contract, then,
transformed itself from a formal contract codified in federal law
to an informal contract. The Contract, which was once plainly
visible, would become invisible, or semi-visible, as necessary.

of Confederates who mistakenly perceived it as a setting conducive to
perpetuation of their endangered culture built upon slave labor.”).
82. See SIMMONS, supra note 81, at 9.
83. See, e.g., LEE-ANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 109
(2008) (describing the Easter Sunday massacre of approximately 150 Black
militiamen in Louisiana by white supremacists in Colfax, Louisiana in 1873);
PAUL ORTIZ, EMANCIPATION BETRAYED: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BLACK
ORGANIZING AND WHITE VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE
BLOODY ELECTION OF 1920, at 62 (2005) (discussing how “all-white juries
allowed white citizens—and law enforcement officials—to inflict physical
harm against African Americans” in Florida).
84. See McCoy, supra note 78 (“[H]istorians say one of the central draws
was a country where Southerners could freeze time and continue a lifestyle
that had been put to a violent end in the United States.”); SIMMONS, supra note
81, at 28 (discussing how “as conditions worsened for former
Confederates . . . the era of group migration began for British Honduras”).
85. See Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging
the Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 679 (2002)
(“Much as the once unspeakable traumas of slavery touched the lives of those
beyond its immediate grasp, . . . the collective memory of klan sexual terror
has persisted, contributing in intangible but nonetheless significant ways to
the perpetuation of de facto subordination in the face of de jure equality.”).

1824

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1803 (2022)
2.

White Supremacy and the Terms of Whiteness

Frances Lee Ansley has defined white supremacy as
encompassing much more than “self-conscious racism of white
supremacist hate groups,”86 classifying it as: “[A] political,
economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly
control power and material resources, conscious and
unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are
widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white
subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of
institutions and social settings.”87 Ansley articulates two models
of white supremacy in her attempt to account for the persistence
of racism and the varied approaches of scholars charting out
legal and political strategies for achieving racial justice—the
class model and the race model.88 The class model characterizes
white supremacy as a system that uses racism as means to
justify and secure class dominance and economic power,89 while
the race model articulates a system in which all white people,
regardless of class, are united in a collective interest to be—and
to feel—superior to non-white peoples, both materially and
psychologically.90
Fusing Ansley’s class and race models, as Ansley herself
recommends,91 provides for a model in which people raced as
white rely on a shared heritage of imperial or colonial rule to
guarantee their exclusive political, economic, and social power.
The contracting of whiteness depends on Black and Indigenous
labor, innovations, and creative talent, and therefore depends
on exclusive control over Black and Indigenous human capital.92
Essentially, white supremacy requires perpetual domination
over Black and Indigenous labor and land, first established via
86. Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of
Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1024.
89. See id. at 1025.
90. See id. at 1035.
91. See id. at 1050 (“The wisdom of both the race and class models are
needed.”).
92. See id. at 1026 (describing a system of “super-exploitation” that
“creates an underclass that can be summoned, moved, or rebuffed almost at
will, thereby facilitating the mobility of capital and improving the system’s
ability to control and channel investment”).
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the commercial contracting of territory and enslaved human
beings.
To maintain this racially-casted domination, signatories to
the social contract of whiteness continue to negotiate the terms
of whiteness to fight the existential threats to that
domination—including the struggle of Black and Indigenous
peoples for their own contracting and property-holding
authority.93 White supremacy is threatened by the presence of
Black and Indigenous peoples on their own native lands with
any other status besides the personal property of white people.
The historical solution to this problem was dispossession (of
land, family, and physical liberty), confinement (to reservations
and plantations), exclusion (from the political project,
citizenship, legal protections, and privileges), and elimination
(via massacres, lynchings, destruction of family structures, and
cultural and discursive erasure).94 These mechanisms are
regularly employed today, via mass incarceration, immigration
policy, gentrification schemes and redlining, the destruction or
dispossession of land and community utilities, social murder,
and systematic killings.95
The ideology of white supremacy justifies such atrocities as
land seizures, enslavements of human beings, and massacres.
Those invested in white supremacy came to believe in the truth
of that ideology, not only because it served their economic
interests, but also because it served their social, psychological,
and political interests.96 Colonizers, slave owners, and every
other
person
invested
in
the
maintenance
of
European-American (physical and political) expansion used

93. See Leong, supra note 70, at 1447–66 (describing the discrepancies
between white and non-white people as it pertains to the right to contract and
the right to property); Harris, supra note 30, at 1727–28 (discussing whiteness
as a property interest in the context of the Native American experience with
the property laws of the colonizers).
94. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1736 (“Many theorists have traditionally
conceptualized property to include the exclusive rights of use, disposition, and
possession, with possession embracing the absolute right to exclude.”).
95. See Hansford & Jagannath, supra note 22, at 123, 154.
96. See Tom Gjelten, White Supremacist Ideas Have Historical Roots in
U.S. Christianity, NPR (July 1, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://perma.cc/S5XV-2C9B
(“A fear that their regional culture was at risk lay behind much of the
opposition to the civil rights movement among Southern Christians.”); Ansley,
supra note 86, at 1025.
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philosophy, science, and religion to empiricize—and therefore
legitimize—white supremacy, which was meant to legitimize
the brutal methods by which the racial state would be
established and perpetuated.97 Under this model, the
signatories to whiteness had to believe that the sons of Europe
were destined and called by God to dominate and order the
world as they pleased, and that whatever they did to African and
Indigenous peoples—no matter how immoral, destructive, or
violent—was good and, more importantly, innocent because
African and Indigenous people were not human and could never
become political or legal persons with rights.98 This ideology
places African and Indigenous people outside of the realm of
polities that white men have built around and on top of them,
on their soil, and with their forced labor, excluding them from
citizenship and the authority to contract, hold, and convey
property associated therewith.99
3.

The Racial Superstate: Whiteness, Extraction, and
Exploitation Worldwide

While this Article focuses on how whiteness is negotiated
and ultimately contracted in the United States, whiteness is
indeed a form of property for which people continue to bargain.
In Puerto Rico, for example, where a significant percentage of
the population is of African descent, approximately 75 percent
of the population identifies as white.100 By attempting to bargain
for whiteness as a social and political status simply by asserting
it (and by denying Blackness), Afro-Puerto Ricans are
attempting to obtain the privileges that whiteness affords and
avoid the burdens of Blackness.101 In South Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa, even in non-white societies, the practice of
skin bleaching is prevalent because of the social capital—and
97. Id.
98. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 20–21.
99. See id. at 11.
100. See Natasha S. Alford, Why Some Black Puerto Ricans Choose ‘White’
on the Census, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/AM9N-3J2H (last
updated Aug. 7, 2020).
101. See id. (describing the historical privileging of whiteness on the
island, formalized by the policy of gracias al sacar, which allowed Black Puerto
Ricans with mixed racial heritage to petition Spain to be reclassified as white
for a fee).
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corresponding political and financial capital—attached to (even
the appearance of) whiteness.102
Mills discusses the Racial Contract not just as a
foundational element of the Racial State, but also of the Racial
Superstate.103 The creation of race and whiteness was not only
a means of developing the American project then, but also of
creating the present global institutional order and global
governing frameworks and norms.104 Whiteness was created to
facilitate imperial conquest and colonial rule. But whiteness has
not only achieved its goals through crowns and formal colonial
dominions. States may now rely upon the private sector to
uphold racist social contracting through the use of commercial
contracting, especially where public-private contracting and
partnerships are in play.
As discussed later in the Article, the employment of
private-public contracting in Detroit effectuates the state’s
dispossession of Black Detroiters of water and real property
through the creation of the Great Lakes Water Authority
(GLWA), a public body corporate.105 This is not a uniquely
American problem, as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has
accelerated his policy of seizing Afro-Indigenous lands for use by
corporate developers.106 Tendayi Achiume describes the global
102. See Pavithra Rao, Paying a High Price for Skin Bleaching, AFR.
RENEWAL (Apr. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/7RPV-KS8Q (quoting Shingi Mtero
as saying, of the reasons for skin bleaching, “[I]t’s not necessarily to physically
be white, it’s about wanting to access things white people have easy access
to— privileges, economic and social status. . . . Light skin is what men
want . . . marriage serves as a form of social capital”); Francesca Regalado,
Asia’s Skin Whitening Market Reckons with Global Antiracist Push, NIKKEI
ASIA (July 1, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://perma.cc/D9DF-VT6H (“Skin whitening
products continue to be widely available and popular in South and Southeast
Asia, where there is a history of equating fairness with beauty, related to
status and the influences of the colonial era.”).
103. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 33 (“Globally, the
Racial Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world;
locally, within Europe and the other continents, it designates Europeans as
the privileged race.”).
104. See id. at 36–39 (discussing the global dominance of “Europe and the
former white settler states,” namely in terms of the “centrality of racial
exploitation to the U.S. economy”).
105. See infra Part III.
106. See Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, As Bolsonaro Keeps Amazon
Vows, Brazil’s Indigenous Fear ‘Ethnocide’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020),
https://perma.cc/9ZTU-HXTF (describing President Bolsonaro’s campaign of

1828

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1803 (2022)

“extractivism economy,” in which “the removal of raw materials

from territories that were previously colonized” is followed by
“the processing, sale and consumption of those materials in a
global economy that disproportionately benefits nations,
transnational corporations and consumers in the Global North
or so-called developed world.”107 Where states can no longer
openly subordinate entire swaths of the Global South’s
populations to white domination under formal colonialism, they
have allowed corporations to replicate and reify the colonial
sociopolitical and economic order through their business plans
and practices.108
B. Whiteness as Property, Whiteness as Contract
In Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris articulates her
theory of the racial subordination of Black and Native American
peoples in the United States as undergirded by “a racialized
conception of property implemented by force and ratified by
law.”109 My intervention is straightforward. Because property is
acquired and disposed of pursuant to contracting, my theory of
whiteness as contract operationalizes Harris’s theory of
whiteness as property110 and contributes an operator’s manual
for the machinery of white supremacy. Harris identifies the
mechanisms of the Racial Contract without specifically naming
them: she says that whiteness as property “has taken on more
subtle forms, but retains its core characteristic—the legal
legitimation of expectations of power and control that enshrine
the status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the

commercial development of Indigenous lands and his destruction of legal
protections thereof); Jessica Brice & Michael Smith, The Amazon Is Fast
Approaching a Point of No Return, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2021, 12:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/3A8H-R4CX (“Brazil’s government is engaged in an active
campaign to open up the Amazon to privatization and development—first by
turning a blind eye as public and protected lands are raided and cleared, and
then by systematically pardoning the people responsible and granting them
legal title to the stolen lands.”).
107. E. Tendayi Achiume (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance), Global
Extractivism and Racial Equality, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/54 (May 14, 2019).
108. See id. at 12.
109. Harris, supra note 30, at 1715.
110. Id.
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maintenance of white privilege and domination.”111 Whiteness
as property explains whiteness as a possession, as capital,112 and
as a status113 in which one holds a property interest.114 It
explains race as a noun.
Whiteness as contract explains the utilization of private
order and private law to mask itself and its protection of racial
constructions, as well as how exactly it preserves power and
control over property. It explains whiteness as activity and
process—as formation, negotiation, performance, enforcement,
remedy. Whiteness as contract explains the never-ending
renegotiation and reifying of race-ing—as a verb.
Property and contract are companions, and this
relationship has long been recognized in federal American law.
The rights to enjoy contract and property are core, twin benefits
of American citizenship, which the Reconstruction Era statutes,
sections 1981 and 1982, make explicit.115 These statutes,
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, specify that “all
persons” shall have the rights to “make and enforce contracts”116
and to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property”117 “as is enjoyed by white citizens.”118 The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an attempt at formal revocation of
the Racial Contract. And it is significant that lawmakers viewed
as crucial the combined dismantling of the Contract and the
legal construction of racial equity with respect to the rights of
contracting and proprietorship.

111. Id.
112. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2158
(2013) (“American history reveals a long tradition of assigning value to race.
Whiteness and property are intricately related. Historically, whiteness both
allowed possession of property and itself functioned as property . . . .”).
Notably, whiteness functions as financial capital as well as social capital, each
of which may be converted into the other. Id. at 2156.
113. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1734–37 (describing whiteness as
“status property” that can be converted into tangible property).
114. See id. at 1734 (stating that the reputation of being white “was
treated as a species of property, or something in which a property interest
could be asserted”).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982.
116. Id. § 1981.
117. Id. § 1982.
118. Id. §§ 1981–1982.
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In my definition in whiteness as contract, the rights of
people raced as white to contract and enjoy property and
proprietorship are an essential term. Equally essential to the
contract is that Black proprietorship and economic, social, or
political competition with white persons are verboten. This is not
to suggest that Black people cannot buy, sell, rent, or sublet real
property. Rather, Black people occupy a place of permanent
month-to-month and at-will tenancy in the United States and,
as such, they have no rights or protections in the United States
on which they can regularly or reasonably rely. When they
benefit from the democratic project or from the market economy,
it is often as third-party beneficiaries; when they participate in
the same, it is often as subcontractors; and when that
participation or benefit becomes a threat to white domination, it
becomes a problem to be solved.
The right to enjoy contract and property has historically
been central to whiteness and citizenship in the United
States,119 with whiteness and citizenship as interchangeable
statuses under federal law prior to Reconstruction.120 Despite
formal changes to the letter of the law, the centrality of contract
and property to whiteness, and therefore, to full citizenship,
endures. Because, as discussed in Part II, the terms of whiteness
construct Black people below and outside of personhood, Black
people do not fully enjoy the right to contract, or even the legal
capacity to contract, with the state. Neither can Black people
expect the state, then comprised exclusively of the white body
politic, to respect their ownership or possession of real or
personal property, inclusive of their common water supply.
II. THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT: IN BLACK AND WHITE
In Part II, I offer a definition of whiteness as contract that
challenges the exclusivity of mainstream private contract theory
119. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1715–16; see generally Leong, supra note
70 (discussing the invisibility and centrality of whiteness in the United States,
made visible in U.S. federal law by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982);
120. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1744; see also Brief for Plaintiff in Error
at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210) (describing whiteness
as the “most valuable sort of property”); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
451–52 (1857) (enslaved party) (permanently excluding Black people and their
descendants from U.S. citizenship, based on the right of white people of
“property in a slave . . . expressly affirmed in the Constitution”).
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while also demonstrating the role that commercial contracting
plays in facilitating and enforcing racial social contracting. A
key element of the contracting of whiteness is its duality. Achille
Mbembe says, “a proslavery democracy is . . . characterized by
its bifurcation.”121 This duality allows it to operate unseen, even
in plain sight. It is both metaphorical and tangible, camouflaged
in private ordering by public entities. It is the life force of liberal
democracy and dependent on the tyrannical rule of some by
others.122 The Contract is both forbidden by antidiscrimination
laws and facilitated by them.
Because the “racial contract is an exploitation contract,”123
it necessarily fails to contemplate or engage those it seeks to
exploit,124 and instead contracts them as objects of the contract
and the ensuing exploitation and extraction.125 Central to the
racial contract is the bifurcated construction of race in a manner
that supports economic exploitation and extraction. Those raced
as white are considered human and political and regarded as
citizens, shareholders, contractors, and proprietors; those raced
as non-white are considered subhuman and apolitical and
regarded as strangers, trespassers, criminals, leeches, and
contracted-for property.126 The theory of whiteness as contract
adds a key and complex component to Mills’s theory: it is a
theory of contract that depends upon the presence of, and
harmony between, metaphorical, real-but-intangible, and
121. ACHILLE MBEMBE, NECROPOLITICS 17 (2019). Per Mbembe, such a
society is comprised of two orders—“a community of fellow creatures
governed . . . by the law of equality” and “a category of non-fellows . . . that is
also established by law.” Id. The white body politic that forms the racial state
is that community of fellow creatures, while non-white people are governed
“by the law of inequality” in what Mbembe describes as a “community of
separation.” Id. at 17–18.
122. See id. at 17.
123. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 9.
124. See id. at 3 (“[T]he peculiar contract to which I am referring . . . is not
a contract between everybody (‘we the people’) but between just the people who
count, the people who really are people (‘we the white people’).”).
125. See id. at 11–12 (“[T]he Racial Contract is not a contract to which the
non-white subset of humans can be a genuinely consenting party.”).
126. See id. at 11 (“The Racial Contract is that set of . . . agreements or
meta-agreements . . . between . . . one subset of humans, henceforth
designated as ‘white, and coextensive . . . with the class of full persons, to
categorize the remaining subset of humans as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and
inferior moral status . . . .”).
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tangible and enforceable contracts. That is to say, the
contracting of whiteness is a complex system of tacit social
contracting and commercial contracting that secures and
protects property and wealth for a self-created, exclusionary, yet
ever-negotiable “community of fellow creatures.”127
Whiteness as contract is an agreement of the authors of the
global settler colonial project, bargained-for amongst
themselves to establish white supremacy, via the expropriation,
extraction, and exclusive domination of real property, natural
resources, human or other capital, and sociopolitical franchise.
The contractors bargained for exclusive white economic,
political, and social power—or full personhood—and they also
bargained for the exclusion of Black people from full personhood,
including the right to contract with the white body politic or
exercise personal, social, or political proprietorship.128 As a
social contract, whiteness uses the law to perpetuate social
order—capitalizing on both public and private law when it can
and resorting to private ordering when public law is unavailable
or too inconvenient.129 Constitutions and statutes give
whiteness the force of law; however, the invisible law of
whiteness, which was negotiated by the people who orchestrated
political domination in the United States at its founding, now
serves as a shadow Constitution. When it is not legally
enforceable under public law, it may be legally enforceable
under private ordering, or even physically enforceable via
sanctioned means regardless of their illegality or obvious
injustice.
The application of contractual theory and language to the
discussion of racist human rights violations provides an
analytical tool for activists and advocates who are conditioned
and educated to view human and civil rights in terms of nature
and morality.130 Though human rights are inalienable,131
humanity alone is insufficient to guarantee respect for those
rights. Rather, laws are constructed and contracted by people
127. MBEMBE, supra note 121, at 17.
128. See id. at 14.
129. Id.
130. For an example of an educational resource on human rights that
describes human rights in terms of nature and morality, see What Are Human
Rights?, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/7DQY-T2XD.
131. Id.

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1833

with the power and authority to engage in contracting and
nation-building. Seeking antiracist social transformation only
on the basis that white supremacy is morally wrong makes little
sense in the face of a social order for which racist economic
exploitation and domination are expressed goals.132 By
explaining the role of contracting in creating and enforcing race
and racism, I attempt to decolonize contract theory—moving
from a theory of contract that assumes racial equality with
respect to contractual capacity to a theory that demands
intersectional analysis because race is central to contractual
capacity and racism is central to a contract’s enforceability.
Classical contract theory requires a bargained-for exchange
resulting in mutual benefits to the contracting parties.133 It
provides for defenses to a breach in performance of the
contract.134 Human and civil rights laws are based on the
principle that all humans have certain inalienable rights;135 as
such, who considers such rights or who qualifies as human is
material information. Also important is what or who determines
which of these rights is inalienable and why. While the rights
may be natural, the laws codifying them in our society are not.
Laws are not only mere human constructions, but also
fundamental human contracts.136 The elements of a contract are
132. As an example, Isabel Wilkerson describes the investment of white
supremacists in Donald Trump’s 2016 candidacy and their hope that his
administration would serve as a “cocksure champion for the dominant caste, a
mouthpiece for their anxieties” and “the last hope for white people” within
America’s “unspoken hierarchy, since the founding of the Republic.” ISABEL
WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 6–7 (2020). An appeal
to the immorality of racism was and has continued to prove ineffective to those
championing the Trump administration. Wilkerson quotes one Trump
supporter as saying of Trump to a Hillary Clinton supporter in 2016, “Yes, I
know he mouths off at times . . . but, he will restore our sovereignty.” Id. at 6.
133. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW 208 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, arts. 1–2 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights . . . . Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind.”).
136. Laws are contracts because they are legally enforceable agreements.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1932); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is
a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
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mutual assent, a bargained-for exchange, and the absence of
defenses such as lack of capacity, duress, undue influence, or
illegality.137 Illegal contracts are unenforceable, as are contracts
made when at least one party was under duress.138 Contracts of
adhesion may also be voidable when they are so lopsided that it
is unconscionable.139
The contract of whiteness relies on strict adherence to
certain terms in order to perform. Whiteness requires exclusive
and ultimate control over wealth, which manifests as
domination of real property, control over non-white persons
present on real property, and an unfettered ability to extract
resources from both the persons and the property.140 As with
tangible, commercial contracts, breaches to the contract of
whiteness are remedied and performance of the contract as per
its terms is prioritized. In this Part of the Article, I consider the
terms of whiteness, but with a focus on how they manifest as
consequences for Blackness.
A. Blackness as Existential Purgatory
The impact of the Detroit water shutoff program on the lives
of the Detroiters subjected to disconnections reveals the
narratives—mostly of Black women—whose existences are
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 332–333 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
138. See id. § 175(1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”).
139. The contract of adhesion is a contract between enterprises with strong
bargaining power and a weaker party, who, “in need of the goods or services,
is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms,” which are “à
prendre ou à laisser.” Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). A
contract of adhesion may be void for unconscionability. See Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding
that when one party lacks meaningful choice and the terms of the contract are
unreasonably favorable to the other party, such a contract may be
unconscionable because of extreme inequality in bargaining power, and thus,
set aside).
140. See Cheryl I. Harris, supra note 30, at 1715–16 (explaining that the
subjugation of Black and Indigenous people—which was accomplished by
making Black people property and taking away Indigenous rights to
property—helped accomplish the goal of exploiting Black labor and conquering
Indigenous lands in the United States).
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suspended between the human and the non-human animal, or
somewhere between life and death. It is a settled fact that
human beings cannot survive without water and cannot thrive
without clean running water.141 It is equally settled, in the
human rights canon, that human beings have a right to water.142
In Detroit, homes subjected to water disconnections risk
referrals to Child and Family Services because homes lacking
running water are considered unsafe for children.143 But no such
right to water is recognized in the United States, which has been
used to justify the water shutoff program by Detroit’s local
government as well as the federal court presiding over Detroit’s
municipal bankruptcy.144
Prior to Governor Whitmer’s institution of a temporary
moratorium on the shutoffs in March 2020,145 Detroiters were
forced to survive for months, and even several years, without
water because of the City’s extremely high water and sewage
pricing.146 One elderly woman, who had been without water for
two years, described saving up enough coins to wash her clothes
at the laundromat every couple of months and only flushing her
toilet after bowel movements.147 Of her plight, she said, “You use
your brain. You scramble. You survive because you’re used to
dealing with nothing.”148 Another woman, Mattie McCorkle,
141. See 1 in 3 People Globally Do Not Have Access to Safe Drinking
Water—UNICEF, WHO, WHO (June 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/6U54-U8FM;
Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 256.
142. See Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 107,
130 (2020) (citing U.N.H.R. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Human Right to Safe Drinking Water & Sanitation, 10 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/39
(Aug. 5, 2015)).
143. See MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILDREN’S PROTECTIVE
SERVICES MANUAL § 71311 (Apr. 2021).
144. See Lyda v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 841 F.3d 684,
699– 700 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that they had a
“substantive due process ‘right to water service at a price they can afford to
pay’” because “there is no fundamental right to water service”).
145. Mich. Exec. Order No. 202028 (Mar. 28, 2020).
146. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 2; Maria Zamudio &
Will Craft, So Close, Yet So Costly, APM REPS. (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/KVE3-MXA8.
147. See Joel Kurth, Detroiters Struggle to Survive Without City Water,
DET. NEWS, https://perma.cc/2HTQ-ZKV3 (last updated Dec. 14, 2015, 6:50
AM) (quoting longtime Detroit resident Fayette Coleman).
148. Id.
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described the experience of filling up buckets of water at a car
wash for months to bathe herself and her three children as if she
were “less than a person.”149
The treatment of Detroiters like Ms. McCorkle by their local
governments begs the question: In a society where all people are
guaranteed equal rights under the law, are Black people really
people at all? Bernadette Atuahene and Timothy Hodge
underscored the centrality of property to personhood in their
work on the property foreclosure scandal in Detroit by
mentioning that foreclosure has “injurious emotional, social,
political, and cultural consequences” as well as financial
impact.150 Of the relationship between home ownership and
personhood, Atuahene and Hodge note, “When the home is
foreclosed upon, a family loses more than an economic asset;
their personhood is also impacted.”151 There are political
ramifications bearing on personhood too, because ownership of
“property serves as a bulwark against state encroachment on
individual autonomy.”152 Ms. McCorkle’s feelings of
sub-humanity, then, stem from the fact that the deprivation of
an essential utility—itself property, and also inextricably linked
to the habitability of her real property—stripped her of social,
political, and even natural personhood by the state.153
Commissioner Welch’s views on race and personhood were
not only a reflection of Justice Taney’s view on Black
sub-personhood in Dred Scott,154 but also reflect Homer Plessy’s
views concerning whiteness as capital155 and the Supreme
Court’s rulings attaching American citizenship to one’s status
as either white or Black per the Naturalization Act of 1906.156
149. Joel Kurth, In Detroit, Surviving Without Running Water Has Become
a Way of Life, BRIDGE MICH. (Oct. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Kurth, Surviving
Without Running Water], https://perma.cc/M5TZ-7VF4.
150. Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L.
REV. 263, 267–68 (2018).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 268.
153. See Kurth, Surviving Without Running Water, supra note 149.
154. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (enslaved
party).
155. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 120 (describing whiteness
as the “most valuable sort of property”).
156. See, for example, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207 (1923), in
which Thind attempted to premise his eligibility for status as white, and
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In Plessy v. Ferguson,157 the Court upheld racial segregation by
declaring that Black people were “separate but equal”—“tiered
personhood”158 that elevated the legal status of Black peoples in
the United States while still insisting upon their subjugation.
Though centuries have passed since the Three-Fifths
Clause was repealed and replaced by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the sociopolitical personhood of Black people in
America remains an unsettled question. The legal rights of
Black Americans, while solid in theory and codified, are still
uncertain in practice. Where rights and remedies are concerned,
social contract theory asserts that natural humanity has never
been enough. Rights are political constructions, given force by
and through law, and most importantly, bargained for by a body
politic.159 That Black people have been excluded from the body
therefore, U.S. citizenship, on his own “revulsion” toward lower caste Indians,
which he presented to the Court as comparable to white anti-Blackness in the
United States (and proof of his own whiteness). This Article focuses on
anti-Black racism, but it is also important to recognize that the contracting of
whiteness applies similar, if not identical, terms of sub-humanity to
Indigenous life. Justice Marshall’s doctrine of discovery obliterated Indigenous
rights, identity (which is deeply connected to land), and sovereignty by
declaring that Indigenous lands belonged to the United States government
because the U.S. government had taken them. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh,
21 U.S. 543, 573–74 (1823) (recognizing the principle that those who “discover”
land, own the land—regardless of prior occupancy by Indigenous people).
When Black people were granted American citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the U.S. government explicitly stipulated that
Indigenous peoples would still be excluded from citizenship, and they were
granted citizenship—without the right to vote—in 1924. See Addie C. Rolnick,
The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 958, 980–81 (2011). The U.S. government used the grant of citizenship
to Indigenous Americans—not all of whom wished to become U.S. citizens—as
a method of forcibly assimilating Indigenous people and stripping them of
their cultural identities. Id. The goal was to “kill the Indian in [them] and save
the man,” which clearly characterizes Indigeneity as inconsistent with
humanity. Id. at 980; see ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 169 (2014).
157. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
158. Ellis, supra note 70, at 724, 733.
159. That civil and political rights are bargained for by citizenry is central
to social contract theory. See JEAN-JACQUES ROSSEAU, A TREATISE ON THE
SOCIAL COMPACT; OR THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW 29 (1762); Carliss
Chatman, If a Fetus Is a Person, It Should Get Child Support, Due Process and
Citizenship, WASH. POST (May 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/J5UR-B9WM
(discussing the passage of the Alabama Human Life Protection Act, which
confers personhood on fetuses from the point of conception onward and making
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politic necessarily means that rights that would apply to them
on the basis of their natural humanity in theory, do not apply to
them in practice.160
Of course, many Black scholars have addressed Black
people’s persistent exclusion from full citizenship benefits in the
United States (and beyond) despite the nation’s formal
commitments to the equality of all citizens under the law.161
Journalist and author Isabel Wilkerson has advanced a theory
of race as a mere “visible manifestation” of the nation’s caste
system, which concerns power and is perpetuated by division of
labor.162 For Wilkerson, the subordination of some people under
others is, as Mills posits, about exploitation and domination, but
unlike Mills, Wilkerson minimizes race as a sort of discursive
crutch that Americans use when they should, in fact, be
describing caste.163 While I agree with Wilkerson that white
supremacy is sustained by the caste-ing of human beings and
that white supremacy has always held wealth extraction and
domination as its goals,164 I join the chorus of race scholars who

the case that such personhood must be accompanied by the full benefits of
citizenship, including due process rights).
160. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 13 (describing a
departure from the social contract with disparaging effects on Black people).
161.
See S. David Mitchell, Undermining Individual and Collective
Citizenship: The Impact of Exclusion Laws on the African-American
Community, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 833, 842 (2007) (“Today, the exclusion of
women, African-Americans, and other groups from American society is not
sanctioned. No one person in contemporary American society is considered
more important than any other—it is that notion of equality that forms the
basis of American citizenship.”).
162. See Sunil Khilnani, Isabel Wilkerson’s World-Historical Theory of
Race and Caste, NEW YORKER (Aug. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/PT4C-FEUE
(“Underlying and predating racism, and holding white supremacy in place, is
a hidden system of social domination: a caste structure that uses neutral
human differences, skin color among them, as the basis for ranking human
value.”); see generally WILKERSON, supra note 132.
163. Wilkerson claims that “race does the heavy lifting for a caste system
that demands a means of human division.” WILKERSON, supra note 132, at 18.
She further claims that “we may mention ‘race,’ referring to people as black or
white or Latino or Asian or indigenous, when what lies beneath each label is”
caste. Id.
164. See id. at 42–43 (describing the enslavement of Africans in the United
States as a response “to the European hunger for the cheapest, most pliant
labor to extract the most wealth from the New World”).
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understand that while caste is not necessarily race, race is
always caste.165
Atiba Ellis’s theory of tiered personhood posits Blackness as
a form of personhood that is subordinated to whiteness but still
part of the political and social project.166 Per Ellis, political
personhood is a status allowing people to exercise constitutional
rights and receive constitutional protections, and a framework
for reifying status and stratifying those of certain status and
power above or below others.167 Notably, Ellis describes the
concepts of personhood and citizenship as conceptually
distinct.168 The Racial Contract essentially fuses the two
concepts by granting those natural persons raced as white full
personhood, citizenship in both the racial state and the racial
superstate, and the core rights (of property and contract)—and
by stripping those raced as Black of political personhood,
citizenship, and rights169 irrespective of formal legal
transformations-as-codified.
Lolita Buckner Inniss also elucidates the dynamics created
and exploited by whiteness in her work on white witnesses. For
Inniss, white people and men are public people who “deploy
power both by observing and by being observed . . . dismantle
and erect visual barriers by shaping laws, rules and norms,”
while non-white people and non-men are private people “who see
little and are little seen.”170 Whiteness requires the relegation of
non-white people to private life because the public domain is the
political, contracting, and decision-making realm from which
non-white people are excluded so that they may be efficiently
165. See, e.g., id. at 42 (noting, in her description of the development of
caste in the now-United States, that Indigenous peoples and Africans already
occupied the lowest rungs of hierarchy because they were not Christians “upon
arrival” and that the “concept of race” would emerge to “justify their eventual
and total debasement”); id. at 17 (acknowledging that the American caste
system is “race-based”).
166. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 729–30.
167. See id. at 725.
168. See id. at 724–25.
169. See id. at 731–33 (describing how the Supreme Court systematically
allocated rights due under the Constitution to African Americans in proportion
to acceptable norms of personhood).
170. Lolita Buckner Inniss, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I
A FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/S8BBLRJW.
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and effectively exploited.171 By placing Black people outside of
the public, they are placed out of the realm of politics even when
(or especially if) public law offers a grant of rights and a promise
of equal protection of the law.172 The private order can therefore
carry forth exploitation and human rights abuses not reached
by the law.173 Uncovering abuse and exploitation perpetuated in
the private order often requires the act of a public person—for
example, white witnesses who record abuses against Black
people—to elevate the atrocities experienced by Black people
into public consciousness and discourse.174
Inniss’s theory of the private versus public person is clearly
expressed in Governor Whitmer’s executive order concerning
the water shutoff program in Detroit, which contrasts the health
and wellbeing of Black Detroiters—a private matter of no
concern to the State—with the public health and wellbeing of
white people placed at risk by Black people’s lack of running
water.175 With respect to the human rights abuses and brutality
that the state metes out on Black and Indigenous people,
discussed in Part III, I depart from Inniss’s theory by

171. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 736.
172. See id. (“What was true of these personhood cases concerning African
Americans is that the Court privileged the dominant form of social
construction during American history: white male supremacy.”).
173. See id. (explaining how Supreme Court jurisprudence maintains “a
tiered society where those who possess political personhood in full are allowed
to dominate contests between those who have full personhood and those who
do not”—allowing those with political personhood to better amass capital).
174. See Inniss, supra note 170; Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals
Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 831 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the public “became aware
of the circumstances surrounding George Floyd’s death because citizens
standing on a sidewalk exercised their First Amendment rights and filmed a
police officer kneeling on Floyd’s neck until he died”); Fields v. City of
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he proliferation of
bystander videos has spurred action at all levels of government to address
police misconduct and to protect civil rights.” (internal quotation omitted)). In
an amicus brief by Professors Katherine Mims Crocker and Brandon
Hasbrouck in support of neither party with respect to defendants’ motion to
dismiss in Dyer v. Smith, amici curae discuss “the powerful role that video
recording can play in protecting the public—especially communities of color—
from abusive government conduct.” Brief for Neither Party at 1, Dyer v. Smith,
No. 3:19cv921, 2021 WL 694811 (E.D. Va. 2021).
175. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 202028 (Mar. 28, 2020) (rescinded),
https://perma.cc/AMF7-ASTM (mandating the provision of water to all
Michigan residents to slow the spread of COVID-19).

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1841

understanding “private people” as those “who see much and are
little seen.”176 With respect to policing of Black proprietorship or
possession of space, as discussed in Part III, I would describe
private people as those “who see much and are highly
surveilled.”177
Like Ellis, Pateman and Mills discuss tiered personhood in
The Contract and Domination—writing of white men as
contractors and of white women and non-white men as
subcontractors while non-white women are nonpersons void of
contractual capacity.178 I understand white people to be
contractors—agreeing with Ellis that white men are tiered
higher than white non-men179—and Black and Indigenous
people and lands as the objects of those contracts, or contractees,
and therefore politically nonpersons.180 This is particularly true
in the case of non-white non-men;181 as an exception to the rule,
some non-white non-men and non-white men may act as
subcontractors. Per the theory of sub-contractorship, Black men
have been delegated the power over water policy in Detroit and
trade in the collective of Black women who collect rainwater on
their roofs and any money to pay their water bills as
consideration in exchange for proximity to politics and
power—or to whiteness.182 In the case of Breonna Taylor, a
Black Attorney General failed to indict the police officers who
killed her as she was sleeping, and was immediately placed on
the President’s list for consideration as a potential Supreme
Court Justice candidate.183 Again, the bargained-for
176. Innis, supra note 170.
177. Id.
178. See CAROLE PATEMAN & CHARLES MILLS, THE CONTRACT AND
DOMINATION 4 (2007).
179. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 748.
180.
See id. at 736.
181.
See id. (“[T]he economic status and societal benefits that came from
excluding women from the political sphere and relegating them to the domestic
sphere demonstrated how political personhood was not given to women. It too
created a master class (men) and a subservient class (women).”).
182. See Drew Costley, The Blackest City in the US Is Facing an
Environmental
Justice
Nightmare,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
9,
2020),
https://perma.cc/6AMK-CWCZ.
183. See Andrew Wolfson et al., Trump Lists Kentucky AG Daniel Cameron
as Potential US Supreme Court Nominee, COURIER J., https://perma.cc/38K2CMVZ (last updated Sept. 9, 2020, 7:42 PM).
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consideration was a Black female victim of state violence and
the community seeking justice on her behalf. By contrast, while
white women’s citizenship has been subordinated to white
men’s citizenship, white women retain the de facto policing
power that is a marker of full citizenship184 by regularly using
the power against Black people.185 Race is political and legal,
rather than biological. Whiteness is a constructed identity that
is imbued with power and control, and therefore it is not
particularly remarkable that a person raced as Black of any
gender could reify whiteness as a subcontractor or even as the
head of a local, state, or federal government.186 Not only does
one’s racial status depend upon legal and social definitions, and
change therewith according to time and place, but also the
proximity to whiteness of both individuals and groups of people
is similarly fluid.187 By delegating a measure of the power of
whiteness to individual people raced as Black, signatories to the
contract of whiteness can conceal the existence of the contract
and weaponize the Black subcontractors as a mirage and shield
against Black complainants to gaslight them.
Despite the formal status as American citizens, Black
Americans do not fully enjoy the rights of citizenship. They
instead occupy a place and space outside of politics (social
contracting) and proprietorship (commercial contracting). While
Black people can no longer be held as chattel, the lived realities
of Black Americans are as wards of the state—incarcerated or
not—and as nonpersons whom white civilians have the power to
contain, detain, expel, or eliminate.188 Black people’s possession
184. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 32, at 83–84 (describing the
need for constant surveillance of “sub-persons” by “the coercive arms of the
state”).
185. See, e.g., Kim Wynne, Black Woman Says White Woman Had Police
Called on Her Family at Fort Lauderdale Pool, NBC 6 S. FLA.,
https://perma.cc/X8TV-TKJM (last updated July 25, 2020, 9:26 AM) (“A Black
woman is speaking out and organizing a protest after she says the police were
unjustly called on her and her family while they were swimming together at a
pool in a Fort Lauderdale park.”).
186. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1717.
187. See Ellis, supra note 32, at 733.
188. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1716 (“Even in the early years of the
country, it was not the concept of race alone that operated to oppress Blacks
and Indians; rather, it was the interaction between conceptions of race and
property that played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and
economic subordination.”).
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of property—as owners or occupiers—is consistently and
persistently threatened, whether by deed theft or
discriminatory property tax assessments,189 by unfair utility
pricing structures,190 immigration policy,191 or modern-day
lynch mobs.192 Black people are tenants at best and trespassers
at worst; they are natural-born persons, but not part of the
American body politic; they are not contractors, but often the
objects of the contract or the consideration therefore. Because
Black people are present but not persons within the United
States, they are not legally or politically alive; moreover, even
physically speaking, while alive, Black people are often near
death, near-death, or nearly dead.
B. Blackness, Reliance, and Promissory Estoppel
If the idea of Black sub-personhood or non-personhood as a
bar to Black contractual capacity leaves some unconvinced, then
the fact that Black people exist and operate under continuous
duress also means that Black people cannot contract, and
therefore cannot be contractors, with the State.193 Part III of this
Article articulates a theory of brutality as a contractual

189. See Andrew Van Dam, Black Families Pay Significantly Higher
Property Taxes than White Families, New Analysis Shows, WASH. POST (July
2, 2020), https://perma.cc/XV8R-YPEG (explaining that, nationally, “black
families pay 13 percent more in property taxes each year than a white family
would in the same situation, a massive new data analysis shows”).
190. See Kathiann M. Kowalski, Racial Disparities Persist in Electric
Service. Is ‘Willful Blindness’ to Blame?, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (July 1,
2020), https://perma.cc/EP27-S5U6 (“On average, African Americans pay a
disproportionately greater share of their income for energy needs . . . .”).
191. See Charles Kamasaki, US Immigration Policy: A Classic,
Unappreciated Example of Structural Racism, BROOKINGS (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4WLZ-KFZQ (“The toughening of immigration laws coincided
with a shift of immigration from Europe to newcomers from Latin America,
Asia, and Africa, often in the context of racialized debates targeted mainly at
Latinos.”).
192. See Sean Collins, Ahmaud Arbery Was Lynched, VOX (May 21, 2020,
10:30 AM), https://perma.cc/F93K-NJRQ (comparing Ahmaud Arbery’s
murder to past lynchings and commenting that “[i]n watching that video, we
don’t just see Arbery’s final moments; we are also reminded of the ugly, racist
history that has left the US with a sinister legacy it has been unable to reckon
with”).
193. Duress makes a contract unenforceable and voidable. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 174–175 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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enforcement mechanism, which suggests not only that Black
people’s duress under the yoke of that brutality makes
contracting impossible, but also that Black people are governed
to perpetuate Black duress—for the express purpose of making
Black contracting and proprietorship impossible.
The theory of the Black subcontractor makes a noble effort
to account for Black people’s engagement in commercial contract
and participation in government as voters, elected officials, and
as political appointees and civil servants.194 However, the theory
possesses one insurmountable flaw if the theory of whiteness as
contract is to hold: the theory of whiteness does not allow for
Black privity with or inclusion in the state. Subcontractors are
still contractors, and Blackness’s lack of contractual capacity is
central to the theory of whiteness.
A better explanation for Black Americans’ continued
engagement with the State, agitation for inclusion in and
protection by the State, participation in the State, and reliance
on the State is the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which serves
as an alternative to consideration.195 A claim of promissory
estoppel is established by demonstrating four elements: a
promisor, a promise, reasonable reliance upon a promise, and
detriment suffered by the promisee.196 While Black people do not
have the capacity to contract with the State and therefore have
no enforceable contracts with the State per the terms of

194. See Anna Brown & Sara Atske, Black Americans Have Made Gains in
U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5VR3-KM5F (providing statistics demonstrating the steady
increase in black political leadership at the federal level since 1965).
195. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 317 (1986) (“[B]argained-for consideration and non-bargained-for
reliance are equivalent to the extent that the existence of either in a
transaction may manifest the intentions of one or both of the parties to be
legally bound.”); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 62 (1936) (“The difficulties in proving
reliance and subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that [people]
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way of judicial relief
would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal sanction was
of significance to [them].”).
196. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1932) (“A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”).

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1845

whiteness, they have reasonably relied upon the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866, 1964,197 and 1968,198 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for the rights
to contract and proprietorship, and indeed, for their due process
rights and the other benefits of American citizenship.199 The
case studies in Part III demonstrate the ways in which Black
Americans rely on the formal promise of equality under the law,
which includes the rights to contract and proprietorship, to their
detriment. The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides a clear
and convincing explanation for why Black Americans continue
to agitate for rights they deserve despite the resistance of the
white body politic to include them in their social contracting.
Significantly, the doctrine of promissory estoppel provides
remedies for Black Americans for their reasonable reliance,
which offers a path toward reparatory measures for those Black
people who have been wrongfully deprived of their life, liberty,
and property as the result of their reliance on a right to contract
and proprietorship.
The right to enjoy contract and property is, and historically
has been, central to whiteness and citizenship in the United
States,200 with whiteness and citizenship as interchangeable
statuses under federal law prior to Reconstruction.201 Despite
formal changes to the letter of the law, not much has changed;
197. Pub. L. No. 89352, 78 Stat. 241.
198. Pub. L. No. 90284, 82 Stat. 73.
199. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 733 (detailing “the process of defining
personhood, in how African Americans were excluded entirely from
personhood in Dred Scott, granted limited personhood through partial
recognition of citizenship rights in Plessy, and then ultimately granted full
personhood by the Court in Brown”).
200. See generally Leong, supra note 70 (discussing the invisibility and
centrality of whiteness in the United States, made visible in U.S. federal law
by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982); Harris, supra note 30.
201. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896) (describing Plessy’s
argument that “the reputation of belonging to . . . the white race, is ‘property,’
in the same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property”); Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451 (1857) (enslaved party) (excluding Black
people and their descendants from U.S. citizenship, based on the right of white
people to “property in a slave . . . expressly affirmed in the Constitution”);
Harris, supra note 30, at 1744 (“The concept of whiteness was carefully
protected because so much was contingent upon it. Whiteness conferred on its
owners aspects of citizenship that were all the more valued because they were
denied to others. Indeed, the very fact of citizenship itself was linked to white
racial identity.”).
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the racial contract endures. Because the racial contract
constructs Black people below and outside of personhood, it
follows that Black people do not enjoy the right to contract, or
even the legal capacity to contract, with white people or with the
State. Neither can Black people expect the racial state to respect
their possession of real or personal property, including their
common water supply; in fact, insofar as Black proprietorship
breaches the terms of the racial contract, Black people should
expect the racial state to seek to remedy the breach.
C. Blackness as Tenancy and Trespass: Resistance to Black
Proprietorship
Resistance to Black and Indigenous proprietorship is a
defining characteristic of the contract of whiteness. The
whiteness contract comes with a noncompete clause that must
be enforced across a multitude of platforms and sectors.202 From
the formal designation of Black people as property before the
end of slavery in the United States,203 to legally enforced
segregation in the United States,204 to the present-day racial

202. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 30, at 1758–77 (examining how whiteness
pervades institutions such as higher education).
203. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (“In the opinion of the court . . . neither
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants . . . were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended
to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.”).
204. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51 (establishing the doctrine of separate
but equal).
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discrimination when buying205 or selling a home,206 Black
proprietorship continues to pose a threat to whiteness that is
unacceptable to whiteness’s signatories, notwithstanding the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.207
Exclusive white proprietorship includes exclusive control
over politics, history, time, and space as well. Anti-Black voter
suppression efforts, from the historical literacy tests and poll
taxes, 208 to the fight over mail-in voting,209 voter ID
requirements, 210 and early voting that played a prominent role
in President Trump’s challenges to the 2020 presidential

205. See Ann Choi et al., Long Island Divided, NEWSDAY (Nov. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/S8WZ-WN3X (“In one of the most concentrated investigations
of discrimination by real estate agents in the half century since enactment of
America’s landmark fair housing law, Newsday found evidence of widespread
separate and unequal treatment of minority potential homebuyers and
minority communities on Long Island.”); Sascha Pfeiffer & Stefano Kotsonis,
Newsday Investigation Reveals Sweeping Real Estate Discrimination on Long
Island, WBUR (Nov. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/D96V-YAN5 (detailing a
three-year investigation that found that African Americans were regularly
steered away from predominantly white neighborhoods by real estate agents);
Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Modern-Day Redlining: How Banks
Block People of Color from Homeownership, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2018, 2:30
PM), https://perma.cc/RLS6-4XJS (“Fifty years after the federal Fair Housing
Act banned racial discrimination in lending, African Americans and Latinos
continue to be routinely denied conventional mortgage loans at rates far
higher than their white counterparts.”).
206. See Debra Kamin, Black Homeowners Face Discrimination in
Appraisals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/VT7N-C4CA (last
updated Aug. 27, 2020) (stating that the homes of Black homeowners are
appraised at lower values than those of their white counterparts).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”).
208. See White Only: Jim Crow in America, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM
AM. HIST., https://perma.cc/L5MD-KTXT (explaining that voting barriers
sharply reduced the number of registered Black voters in the South).
209. See Jane C. Timm, An All-Out War over Mail Voting Has Erupted in
Courts Across the U.S. Here’s What’s at Stake, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2020, 5:30
AM), https://perma.cc/U8LK-8R57 (reporting on the “more than 175 suits in
43 states” contesting mail-in voting laws).
210. See Eliza Sweren-Becker & Hannah Klain, The Fight for Voting
Rights in 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/82TQ-AD7V (“[M]ore than 160 bills introduced at the state
level would restrict voters’ access to the ballot . . . .”).
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election results,211 signatories to the Racial Contract continue to
resist Black political proprietorship—from governance to the
exercise of the right to vote consistently. In Part III, I discuss
the resistance to Black governance of American urban centers
such as Detroit. In previous work, I have discussed the
propagation of derogatory narratives about urban centers led by
Black governments as a mechanism for destabilizing those cities
and justifying their destabilization, and the extractive
rent-seeking practices of the white body politic resentful of its
post-desegregation loss of political power.212
The ideological conditioning of the public to believe in the
benevolence and banality of white supremacy, as well as the
wickedness, frivolity, and criminality of Blackness, is key to
maintaining control over the governance of American urban
centers and those centers’ assets. Ideological conditioning is a
necessary ingredient for constructing race, as societies must
believe in race for race to exist.213 The signatories to the terms
211. In 2020, President Donald Trump sought to cast doubt over the
legitimacy of the presidential election, and then refused to accept the results
and concede after he was defeated at the polls by former Vice President Joseph
Biden. See Ann Gerhart, Election Results Under Attack: Here Are the Facts,
WASH. POST, https://perma.cc/A2XR-CNMB (last updated Mar. 11, 2021, 7:10
PM)
President Joe Biden was sworn in on Jan. 20, 2021. Former
president Donald Trump . . . spent weeks uttering baseless
allegations of election fraud that have been amplified by allies and
conservative media outlets. His campaign . . . went to court in six
states . . . to challenge . . . the vote—and lost more than 60
cases . . . .
see also Juana Summers, Trump Push to Invalidate Votes in Heavily Black
Cities Alarms Civil Rights Groups, NPR (Nov. 24, 2020, 6:26 AM),
https://perma.cc/S544-6P85 (citing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s legal
challenges to the Trump campaign’s efforts to invalidate the 2020 Presidential
election); Mark Niquette & Gregory Korte, Trump Challenge to Election
Results Hits Hardest at Black Voters, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/3C88-4GXD (reporting that the Republican chairwoman of
the Wayne County Board of Canvassers tried to rescind her vote certifying the
election after then-President Trump personally called her).
212. See Marissa Jackson Sow, Coming to Terms: Applying Contract
Theory to the Detroit Water Shutoffs, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 36–37
(2021).
213. See COATES, supra note 51, at 7 (“Americans believe in the reality of
‘race’ as a defined, indubitable feature of the natural world. Racism—the need
to ascribe bone-deep features to people and then humiliate, reduce, and
destroy them—inevitably follows from this inalterable condition.”).
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of whiteness know: in September 2020, then-President Donald
Trump announced that he would create a commission on
patriotic education and a grant for pro-American education in
order to combat growing calls for antiracist education in the
wake of the antiracist uprising stemming from the killing of
George Floyd.214 Per Trump, teaching children about systemic
racism amounted to “child abuse”; he denounced critical race
theory and the New York Times’s 1619 Project as “toxic
propaganda.”215
As discussed below, the denial of Black peoples’ public
personhood is not only political, but quite literal. Black people
are private people, and the cruel irony of this designation is the
fact that their private proprietorship of property is verboten and
resisted with systematic regularity. Black people lack the
capacity for contracting, and therefore lack the capacity for
proprietorship under the Racial Contract. Under the terms of
whiteness, unless as chattel, the only place for Black people is
none at all.216
D. Blackness as Consideration and Cost
Cheryl Harris has recently written, “Chattel (Black) is the
fusion of race and property—embodied as always essential and
forever disposable.”217 Whiteness as property—a status, a
possession—that is contracted for, requires consideration or

214. See Nicole Gaudiano, Trump Creates 1776 Commission to Promote
‘Patriotic
Education’,
POLITICO
(Nov.
2,
2020,
5:36
PM),
https://perma.cc/H5M6-4SQH (reporting that federal grant money would be
used to promote “patriotic education” at public places, such as national parks,
cemeteries, and museums); Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in
Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/D9DT-KRNK (last
updated Sept. 7, 2021) (“Minneapolis police officers arrested George Floyd, a
46-year-old black man, after . . . Mr. Floyd had bought cigarettes with a
counterfeit $20 bill. Seventeen minutes after the first squad car arrived at the
scene, Mr. Floyd was unconscious and pinned beneath three police officers,
showing no signs of life.”).
215. Nick Niedzwiadek, Trump Goes After Black Lives Matter, ‘Toxic
Propaganda’ in Schools, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2020, 1:10 PM),
https://perma.cc/PX4R-ZYF7.
216. See FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM 196–98 (2020) (arguing
that Black people occupy the ontological position of permanent captivity).
217. Cheryl I. Harris, Reflections on Whiteness as Property, 134 HARV. L.
REV. F. 1, 1 (2020).
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something of value that is exchanged so that the contract is fair
and valid.218 Within the context of contracting for whiteness,
Black people and Indigenous land are the consideration, and
thus simultaneously essential and disposable. Black and
Indigenous bodies and land as capital are what make whiteness
and white supremacy possible.219 Whiteness only exists in
opposition to non-whiteness.220 White power exists only in
opposition to Black dispossession.221 White freedom was once
explicitly premised on Black enslavement, and as demonstrated
by the case study of financial extraction from Black Detroiters
by Detroit city government and the surrounding suburbs in Part
III, white wealth is still premised upon the extraction of money
and assets from Black and Indigenous people.222
Even as Black people and their property are bargained for,
Black people are also decidedly, and by definition, outside of the
terms of whiteness. They may be the object of the contracts or
subjected to the execution of the contracts, but they are not the
contractors. If Black people benefit from white racial contracting
and when they are dispossessed or otherwise harmed by the
racial contracting, it is as third-party beneficiaries, survivors, or
collateral damage. When Black contracting and proprietorship
are permitted, it is as an externality. Or, in the case of Detroit,
described in Part III, Black people’s use and enjoyment of water
is an externality to the commercial contracting between the City
218. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1759.
219. See id. at 1774 (“Whiteness conferred on its owners aspects of
citizenship that were all the more valued because they were denied to
others . . . the trajectory of expanding democratic rights for whites was
accompanied by the contraction of the rights of Blacks in an ever deepening
cycle of oppression.”).
220. See WILDERSON, supra note 216, at 196 (arguing that the U.S. would
cease to exist if it ceased being anti-Black).
221. See id. at 209 (theorizing that Black people embody a fundamental
antagonism to civil society—dividing society into “two species: Black and
Human”).
222. See infra Part III; Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 54–55 (discussing
the “sloppy” management of Detroit’s Water and Sewage Department that lead
to the demand of $90 million dollars from Detroit’s poor residents); see also
Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, supra note 142, at 169 (establishing
the concept of the predatory city by discussing the extraction of wealth and
expropriation of property from Black Detroit residents via illegal tax
assessments); Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at 294 (using the Detroit
foreclosure scandal as an example of illegal governmental extraction).

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1851

of Detroit and the GLWA. Though the City and GLWA rely upon
Black Detroiters to meet the cost of regional water and
sewage,223 their access to water itself is not a policy objective.
The increase in waterborne illnesses among Detroiters whose
water was disconnected by the City, similarly, is an unfortunate
cost of the social and commercial contracting between the City
and the suburbs. 224
Black people as consideration and as cost reveals another
aspect of the duality of the Racial Contract that makes the
Contract difficult to recognize and acknowledge. The obscene
exploitation and manipulation of Black people for the sake of
whiteness is what Achille Mbembe has referred to as the
“nocturnal body” of democracy.225 Frank Wilderson’s theory of
Afropessimism sets forth Blackness and Black people as
“integral to human society but at all times and in all places
excluded from it”226—a construction that conforms to a Racial
Contract that excludes Black people from contracting and
proprietorship even as it wholly depends on extracting capital
from Black labor and Indigenous land. For Wilderson, “the
Human is not an organic entity but a construct; a construct that
requires its Other in order to be legible; and . . . the Human
Other is Black.”227
To be Black is to be physically alive, and politically and
economically viable—and profitable—for, and only for, the
benefit of whiteness. To be Black is to be in constant temporal
proximity to death because no matter where the Black body is
physically present, it may be adjudged to be in the wrong place
at the wrong time, or otherwise on property that whiteness
requires and no longer wishes to share. To be Black is to be the
lifeblood of American culture and society, even as Black
223. See Claire Sabourin, Responding to the Detroit Water Crisis: The
Great Lakes Water Authority and the City of Detroit, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
305, 310 (2016) (discussing the timeline of Detroit’s water crisis).
224. See Jennifer Chambers, Experts: Water Shutoffs Causing Public
Health
Emergency,
DET. NEWS (July
26, 2017, 1:08 PM),
https://perma.cc/N35H-TDUA (suggesting that the Detroit mayoral election
negatively influenced the response of researchers who studied the adverse
effects of the water crisis on Detroit residents).
225. See MBEMBE, supra note 121, at 15.
226. Vinson Cunningham, The Argument of “Afropessimism”, NEW YORKER
(July 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/V23L-JEPL.
227. WILDERSON, supra note 216, at ix.
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Americans are choked to death or killed in their sleep by
police.228 It is to be an essential worker during the COVID-19
pandemic, fueling the American economy for the lowest of
wages, while at an increased risk of contracting the deadly virus
because of one’s inability to stay at home.229 To be Black is to be
necessary—mandatory, even—and, precisely because of that, a
problem that must be solved.
E. Breach
Breaches of the terms of whiteness are not only verboten,
but must be remedied, because the Racial Contract is as fragile
as it is firmly rooted in society. As the rights to contracting and
proprietorship are central to whiteness, Black contracting
capacity and proprietorship—public and private—pose
impermissible existential threats to the contract. Though Black
people are not parties to the contracting of whiteness, they are
still capable of interference therewith, even without the intent
to do so, precisely because the contracting of whiteness does not
account for Black humanity and instead counts on the total
exploitation and suppression of Black bodies.230 According to the
terms of whiteness, Black lives do not matter.231 Thus, where
Black contracting and proprietorship significantly threaten the
white body politic’s control of capital and power—as it almost
always does—this activity will be suppressed and undermined
by individual white citizens, the state, or both.232

228. See Evan Hill et al., supra note 214 (compiling the evidence
pertaining to George Floyd’s death); Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., What to Know
About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/T28Y-AG7C (detailing the events surrounding Breonna
Taylor’s death).
229. See Tiana N. Rogers et al., Racial Disparities in COVID-19 Mortality
Among Essential Workers in the United States, WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y,
2020 at 1, 1–2.
230. See WILDERSON, supra note 216, at 216 (“[T]he Slave’s relationship to
violence is open-ended, gratuitous, without reason or constraint . . . .”).
231. See id. at 219 (stating that civil society’s “schema” of violence renders
Black life fungible).
232. See id. at 196 (arguing that civil society is, and always will be,
anti-Black).
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III. CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE AND REMEDY: WHITE
PROPERTY MATTERS
A. The Detroit Water and Mortgage Crises: Structural and
Ideological Violence as Performance Mechanism and Remedy of
Breach
This Part employs case studies to demonstrate how the
terms of whiteness are executed and how breaches of those
terms are remedied. Specifically, the case studies demonstrate
how governments rely on coordinated campaigns of physical
deprivation and psychological, political, and legal gaslighting to
justify the employment of public policy and private ordering to
dispossess Black people of private property and infringe on
Black people’s rights to contract and property.
Detroit and Flint provide excellent examples of how the
white body politic resists and punishes Black proprietorship. In
her discussion of Detroit’s mortgage foreclosure crisis,
Bernadette Atuahene classifies Detroit as a “predatory city,”
which she defines as an “urban area[] where public officials
systematically take property from residents and transfer it to
public coffers, intentionally or unintentionally violating
domestic laws or basic human rights.”233 She then asks the
question central to her writing on the matter: “Why do some
financially desperate cities become predatory?”234 It is helpful to
consider why these cities become financially desperate in the
first instance, and this Part explores answers to both questions
by examining how the local government has used commercial
contracting to extract resources from Detroiters and
redistribute them to suburbanites in support of a white
supremacist social contract that is actively in force in
Southeastern Michigan.
Detroit is the most predominantly Black large city in the
United States235 and has long experienced social strife related to

233. Atuahene, supra note 142, at 107.
234. Id. at 109.
235. See SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 14 (2011),
https://perma.cc/ZYR9-Y7VM (PDF) (“Among the places with populations of
100,000 or more, the place[] with the greatest proportion Black
alone-or-in-combination [was] Detroit, MI (84 percent) . . . .”).
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racism and white supremacy.236 Like other American cities, the
transfer of political and administrative power from white to
Black hands was immediately met with white flight and white
rage by those white Detroiters who would not share space
(Detroit was racially segregated) or power with Black people.237
Black political power was accompanied by the emergence of
Black upper and middle classes in the City of Detroit, whose
members became civil servants, corporate managers and
executives, and homeowners.238 However, white flight cost the
City of Detroit several hundreds of thousands of residents and
the collective value of their tax base.239 Many Black Detroiters
left the city for the suburbs as well, exacerbating Detroit’s
financial woes.240
Prior to the desegregation attempts in Detroit, the city’s
white-led government envisioned, agreed to, and planned for an
expansion of water service to the city’s surrounding suburbs, to
be subsidized by the city.241 This regional plan may be
considered an attempt to realize the ideal socially contracted
society about which John Rawls would later write.242
Desegregation made the plan impracticable; begging a
Black-led, majority-Black city for access to its natural resources
236. Atuahene, supra note 142, at 123 (Detroit’s population is now about
80 percent Black due to “state sanctioned racial and exclusionary zoning, and
racially restrictive covenants, and redlining”).
237. See id.
238. See John Gallagher, 1968 Project: Detroit’s Black Middle Class
Emerged from 1968’s Upheaval, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/E4RD-ABYT (reporting that economic opportunities for Black
Americans “slowly and painfully” opened up after 1968).
239. See id. (“Many whites already believed that the equal opportunity
movement was pushing too aggressively for change. White flight to Detroit’s
suburbs became a flood, ultimately costing the city of Detroit more than half
its population.”); Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 39 (stating that the
exodus of white Detroit citizens to the suburbs was “largely driven by fears of
Black families moving into predominately white neighborhoods”); Atuahene,
supra note 142, at 123 (reflecting on the significance of the 1968 Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in understanding the 1967
Detroit uprising).
240. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1, 40 (stating that
Detroit was in “more than $18 billion in present and future debt”).
241. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59 (describing the City of
Detroit’s plan to provide suburban residents with water at a lower cost than
urban residents).
242. See generally RAWLS, supra note 45.
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was an impermissible breach of terms of whiteness.
Post-segregation, the suburbs and their leaders still wanted
Detroit’s water; however, they did not want to compensate
Detroit for the use thereof. Thus, they united in perpetuating a
distinctly anti‑Black narrative about Detroit as corrupt and
criminal to persuade Detroit to subsidize suburban water
delivery, even as white flight had decreased the city’s population
by hundreds of thousands, making water more expensive for
Detroit residents.243
Because Detroit treats water and sewage as a common
charge, remaining residents were on the hook for the delivery
costs of water and sewage service244—meaning they would have
to pay much more than they would have paid if the city were
more densely populated. Though Detroit sits on the largest
freshwater reservoir in the world, Detroiters have no say in how
much they pay to use the water nor how much the suburbs pay
them to use the water.245 Detroiters’ lack of the water supply
and the costs of water consumption have been exacerbated by
the privatization of the water.246 As a result, pricing for water
and sewage spikes with little notice, as it has for decades, even
though water in the suburbs does not cost nearly as much.247
Detroiters effectively pay white suburban residents reparations

243. See Dana Kornberg, The Structural Origins of Territorial Stigma:
Water and Racial Politics in Metropolitan Detroit, 1950s–2010s, 40 INT’L J.
URB. & REG’L RSCH. 263, 273 (2016); Jessi Quizar, A Bucket in the River: Race
and Public Discourse on Water Shutoffs in Detroit, 26 SOC. IDENTITIES 429,
434–37 (2020) (highlighting a “heavily racialized discourse” in favor of water
shutoffs that distinguished those who are undeserving of sympathy and help
because they are “lazy, unintelligent, irresponsible, conniving, thieving,
criminal, and primitive”).
244. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 44 (stating that the
GLWA “uses Detroit’s water and sewer infrastructure to extend service to
neighboring suburban counties”).
245. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 57 (arguing that the formation of
the GLWA transferred decision-making authority away from Detroit residents
“to the suburbs”).
246. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 42 (“Detroit’s emergency
manager, as part of his purported efforts to address the city’s fiscal challenges,
attempted to privatize Detroit’s water operations by selling the facilities and
operations of DWSD. DWSD increased use of water shutoffs as a collection
method to eliminate delinquent water accounts . . . .”).
247. See id. at 45 (establishing that Detroit’s urban residents pay, on
average, 10 percent more than their suburban counterparts).
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for loss of power and proprietorship by subsidizing the cost of
suburban water.
The Detroit and Flint water crises began in 2013 as former
Michigan governor Rick Snyder was forcing Detroit to declare
bankruptcy and submit to the governance by an emergency
manager.248 At the same time, Detroit elected its first white
mayor in forty years.249 In Flint, longstanding racial resentment
over having to pay the City of Detroit more money prompted
Flint officials to change Flint’s water supply.250 This caused the
delivery of poisoned water to Flint residents,251 which was
subsequently covered up at the highest levels of state
government.252 Meanwhile, the loss of Flint’s custom would
cause the price of Detroit’s high-quality water to rise for Detroit
residents under its common charge pricing structure.253 The rise
in prices meant that Detroiters would not be able to pay for their

248. See id. at 40–41 (explaining that Detroit filed for bankruptcy
protection in 2013); see also Brie D. Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and
Administrative Zombies: How Economic Woes, Outdated Environmental
Regulations, and State Exceptionalism Failed Flint, Michigan, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 653, 683 (2017) (“Of all of the school districts and cities in Michigan where
emergency managers were appointed, it has been estimated that all except one
are majority African-American cities and school districts.”).
249. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Detroit Elects First White Mayor in More
than 4 Decades, CNN, https://perma.cc/EH46-FCFM (last updated Nov. 6,
2013, 9:22 PM) (reporting that Detroit’s last white mayor, Roman Gribbs,
served from 1970 to 1974).
250. See In re Flint Water Cases, 329 F. Supp. 3d 369, 415 (E.D. Mich.
2018) (asserting that Flint residents were deprived of their right to water); see
also Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59 (“[T]he Flint water crisis was caused
when Flint officials decided to change the City’s water source from DWSD in
2013 to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), despite the fact that the
water supplied by DWSD was . . . safer than the water provided by KWA.”).
251. See ANNA CLARK, THE POISONED CITY: FLINT’S WATER AND THE
AMERICAN URBAN TRAGEDY 145 (2018) (stating that Flint’s water supply switch
doubled the percentage of children with high blood lead levels).
252. See id. at 389 (pointing out that Bradley Wurfel, the Director of
Communications for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality,
consistently dismissed studies finding that Flint’s water supply was
contaminated).
253. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59–60 (discussing the resistance
to Detroit’s Black governance and proprietorship of the southeastern Michigan
regional water supply, and how that resistance directly contributed to both the
Flint Water and Detroit Water shutoff scandals).
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water.254 Detroit’s water bills are far higher than the average
water bills throughout the United States.255 Outstanding water
bills were also added to homeowners’ property tax assessments,
which contributed to the number of homes illegally
over-assessed for property taxes during the same time period.256
While it is nearly impossible to prove explicit anti-Black
racist intent on the part of the relevant local, state, and federal
authorities in a way that would meet the standards required by
federal law, the mechanics and the impact of these scandals
point to a decidedly necropolitical governance of Black people
that obsesses over curbing Black power and proprietorship and
expropriation of Black capital.257 Wayne State University Law
Professor Peter Hammer has described the water shutoffs as
“strategic racism.”258 Rent-seeking by predominantly white, far
wealthier suburbs requires that impoverished Black
grandmothers pay close to two hundred dollars per month for
water259 and sewage to rent their own natural resources from a
privatized water authority and also to subsidize the cost of the

254. See Ferretti, supra note 17 (stating that approximately 33,000 homes
lost water access over unpaid bills in 2014).
255. See Maria Zamudio & Will Craft, A Water Crisis Is Growing in a Place
You’d Least Expect It, NPR (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/DZ4F-W366
(finding that a family of four in Detroit paid more for water than families in
Chicago, Buffalo, and Phoenix in 2018).
256. See Atuahene, supra note 142, at 110 (“[M]any affected residents were
not even supposed to be paying property taxes in the first place because they
live below the federal poverty threshold and hence qualified for the Poverty
Tax Exemption (PTE).”).
257. See MBEMBE, supra note 121, at 71 (arguing that scapegoating
non-white people enables the state’s “murderous functions”).
258. PETER J. HAMMER, THE FLINT WATER CRISIS, KWA AND
STRATEGIC-STRUCTURAL RACISM 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/NQ7M-SRTG
(PDF). Professor Hammer describes strategic racism as the manipulation of
intentional racism, structural racism and unconscious biases for political and
economic purposes and posits it as being at play in the Flint Water scandal.
Id. at 3. Hammer has also cited strategic racism as a motivating factor for the
Detroit water shutoff scandal. See Rose Hackman, What Happens When
Detroit Shuts Off the Water of 100,000 People, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/U3X7-MH4J (quoting Professor Hammer’s explanation of
how redlining, white flight, and other factors were partly to blame for how the
water crisis was handled).
259. The Author’s mother, a grandmother living in Detroit, received a bill
(on file with author) for over $180, pursuant to a sudden rate hike, for water
and sewage in August 2020. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 44–48.
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water to the suburbs.260 When extraction as compensation for
Black breach of the Racial Contract is no longer possible,
dehumanization begins: having to collect rainwater in buckets,
not being able to bathe regularly or wash one’s hands, or not
having tap water to drink. The city adopted the practice of
painting taps with bright blue paint after water was
disconnected.261
As the COVID-19 pandemic began to rage, the City of
Detroit and State of Michigan eventually realized that water
deprivation was untenable as a public health matter,262 though
in February 2020 the State of Michigan and the City of Detroit
claimed that water shutoffs had no impact on Detroiters’
health.263 And yet, even after the City’s implementation of a
shutoff moratorium and a $25 fee for water service restoration,
activists and residents complained that water had not been
restored to many households despite Governor Whitmer’s
executive order.264 The City of Detroit blamed the discrepancy
between its claims and the activists’ claims on the number of
vacant houses in Detroit, contending that many homes without
water were not occupied, and further claiming that it had used
“best efforts” to locate occupied homes without water.265 Thus, if
260. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59 (stating that Detroit city
planners consciously decided to supply suburban residents with cheaper water
than urban residents).
261. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 64 (“The spray paint is
a source of humiliation and embarrassment for affected residents and their
neighbors, as it serves no discernable purpose other than to constantly remind
the community that the residents do not have water.”).
262. See Joel Kurth, Detroit Moving Faster to Restore Water, but Hundreds
Still Without Service, BRIDGE MICH. (Mar. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/YTR9ENMN (“Detroit is rushing to restore [water] service because of sanitation
fears as the coronavirus pandemic sweeps Michigan.”).
263. See Joel Kurth, Detroit Says No Proof Water Shutoffs Harm Health.
Get Real, Experts Say, BRIDGE MICH. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/VY9TLFKM (quoting Detroit’s Chief Public Health Officer’s declaration that “there
is no clear data to suggest whether or not there are other health risks related
to water service interruptions”).
264. See id.; Steve Neavling, More Than 2,500 Homes in Detroit Still
Without Water After City Pledged to Restore Service Amid Coronavirus
Outbreak, Det. MetroTimes (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:14 PM), https://perma.cc/XS62A9CX (listing challenges to water restoration such as “getting a response from
tenants or owners of the roughly 2,500 homes without water”).
265. See Sarah Cwiek, Detroit Says It’s Restored Water to Nearly Everyone
Amid
COVID-19,
MICH. RADIO
(Apr.
20,
2020,
6:56
AM),
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the blue paint was not meant to help the City of Detroit in its
record-keeping, it seems very likely that the only goal of the blue
paint was to humiliate the victims of their manmade crisis as
well as threaten their health and wellbeing.266
In Flint, delivering poisoned water to residents and lying
about the water quality was not sufficiently atrocious for local
officials. Flint residents were also subjected to shutoffs for not
paying for the poisoned water, even though they could not use it
and had never agreed to the use of corroded pipes in the first
instance.267
As of December 2021, Governor Whitmer has not put a
permanent end to the water shutoff program, which means that
the water shutoffs may resume whenever she determines that
the state of emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic is
over.268 Governor Whitmer temporarily halted the shutoffs after
determining that the shutoffs placed the lives of Michiganders
in jeopardy, but several days earlier, she declined to do so on
behalf of Detroiters who had submitted their request for a
moratorium on the basis of public health in November 2019.269
The message is clear: the creation of inhumane living
conditions by the state is necessary to govern Black Detroiters,

https://perma.cc/MVP2-ZNPW (quoting the statement by the Director of
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department that the department used “best
efforts” to locate residences without water, reconnect water services, and
remedy the conditions that prevent reconnection).
266. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 213 (“[T]he lack of water
service in many residents’ homes is humiliating to residents because of
Defendant Detroit’s practice of marking customers’ homes with bright blue
paint when their water service is or is about to be disconnected, which leads
to the stigmatization of residents.”).
267. See In re Flint Water Cases, 329 F. Supp. 3d 369, 385 (E.D. Mich.
2018) (stating that many Flint residents were afflicted with illness or disease,
such as Legionnaires’ disease, because of contaminated water).
268. Mayor Mike Duggan has extended a temporary moratorium on water
shutoffs through 2022. See James David Dickson, Water Shutoffs Can Resume
in Michigan, but Communities in No Rush, DET. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2021, 6:05 AM),
https://perma.cc/4UKG-RK4H; see also Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 64
(recognizing that Detroit’s urban residents still lack a seat at the table
concerning the shutoffs).
269. See Caroline Llanes, Whitmer Will Not Use Executive Powers to End
Detroit Water Shutoffs, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/GHC2S9UX (reporting that Civil Rights groups, like the ACLU, are not optimistic
that Governor Whitmer will intervene to end the water shutoffs).
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but such conditions will not be tolerated as long as Black
suffering might create white suffering.270
1.

Contractual Capacity and the Gaslighting of Detroit

Bolstered by the fact that the now-privatized GLWA is a
public body corporate, the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan,
and the federal courts continue to treat Detroiters as if they had
entered into a contract for utilities with the GLWA and are
simply failing to respect their bargain.271 In reality, however, no
such bargain has ever occurred.272
Researchers have studied the impact of racism and racist
narratives on public opinion of the Detroit water shutoffs and
found that anti-Black sentiments have fueled support for the
shutoff program.273 Researchers have also studied racist
resentment of white people against Black municipal governance
in Michigan, finding that such resentment contributed to the
Flint water crisis as well as the Detroit water crisis.274 It is
noteworthy that both water scandals and the mortgage
foreclosure scandal escalated over the same period of time and
emerged out of the same set of transactions.275 Each scandal was
intentionally created via government policy and was reliant on
270. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 64 (“Human health and hygiene
of Black Detroiters is separate from the public health and safety of the state’s
white body politic in the language of the order, and in reality.”).
271. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 43 (explaining that the
GLWA was “designated as a ‘public body corporate’ and it ultimately became
the hub of a regional water system”); Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 38
(“Detroit recognizes no right to water; instead, its leadership has made clear
that water is a utility that may be enjoyed if paid for.”).
272. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 39–40 (“Detroiters do not bargain
with their local government for the rates they pay, nor have they had a say in
the shutoff policy; indeed, due to disenfranchisement, they cannot.”).
273. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 21–23 (arguing that
Black residents “disproportionately experience water shutoffs” because 95
percent of the water shutoffs affected areas with “a population that was
greater than 50% Black”).
274. See Sherwin, supra note 248, at 682 (explaining that state officials in
Flint “made hasty decisions based on economics, giving little thought to the
disproportionate impact to the community,” and that “[s]ocioeconomically
disadvantaged communities have all of the burdens, but lack most of the
amenities”).
275. See Atuahene, supra note 142, at 125 (describing the mortgage crisis
in Detroit, the high mortgage foreclosure rates, and the subprime loans).
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the duality of the public presence of formal law and an invisible,
racist common law.276
In previous work, I asked and answered the following
question: What status do Black people hold within the City of
Detroit? I concluded that Black people had been excluded from
Detroit’s social contract, maintained through private,
commercial contracting.277 I advanced the argument that the
state and local governments’ persistent contentions that
Detroiters were breaching their contracts with the Detroit
Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) and with the GLWA
by failing to pay for water delivery are a form of ideological
conditioning that provided social and political justification for
the governmental shutoff policies.278 The gaslighting of
Detroiters is essential to the success of the water shutoff policies
as depriving human beings of water is too egregious—and too
dangerous—to be allowable without finding a way to hold the
deprived people responsible for the deprivations.279
So goes the history of racist atrocities in the United States,
with the enslavement of Africans and the massacres and
dispossession of Indigenous Americans justified by the
deconstruction of African and Indigenous humanity.280 As
people cannot be deprived of their life, liberty, and property
without good reason, the solution has been to deny the humanity
of the deprived.281 And as life, liberty, and property are the
rights of citizens, excluding classes of people from the citizenry
also opens the door for otherwise impermissible deprivations.282

276. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 63 (“Detroit’s water shutoff crisis
is an unnatural disaster, intentionally designed and executed to cause burden
and suffering to people—relying upon anti-Black narratives and stereotypes
to justify the policy and garner public support.”).
277. See id. at 48–49.
278. See id. at 50.
279. See id. at 35.
280. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1716 (explaining that “the origins of
property rights in the United States are rooted in racial domination” and that
the “interaction between conceptions of race and property . . . played a critical
role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic subordination”).
281. See id. (“The hyper-exploitation of Black labor was accomplished by
treating Black people themselves as objects of property.”).
282. See id. at 1718 (describing the slave codes that “codif[ied] the extreme
deprivations of liberty already existing in social practice” such as preventing
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The pre-desegregation agreements to share Detroit’s water with
the surrounding suburban regions is reflective of social
contracting amongst people who saw shared humanity,
citizenship, needs, and interests in each other, and who were
completely comfortable having collective access to and control of
Detroit’s natural resources as white people.283 Having to share
resources with or rely on Black government officials and
residents for water was decidedly not part of the bargain.284
In fact, the City of Detroit’s response to Detroiters’ real
property ownership and their property interests (to say nothing
of their rights to life) in Detroit’s freshwater reserves is
demonstrative of Detroiters’ lack of contractual capacity as well
as the voidability of the contracts for which they do bargain.285
With respect to the water shutoffs, I have previously explained
that the price of water and sewerage service and delivery in
Detroit is not bargained for democratically, whether by millage,
referendum, or any other means of popular input. Instead, a
Board of Water Commissioners votes on a budget and rate
increases and simply announces when rate increases will go into
effect.286 To the extent that Detroiters do bargain for their water
simply by being present in Detroit-based housing and
consuming that water when available, such a contract would be
a contract of adhesion at best.287 Nor do Detroit residents have
enslaved persons from traveling, owning property, gathering publicly, or being
educated).
283. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59 (describing Detroit’s power
over the water supply and the corrupt nature of the leadership and governance
prior to Detroit’s racial desegregation).
284. See id. (“The high price that Detroiters pay for water is rooted in white
resistance to . . . Black possession of real property and natural resources.”).
285. See id. at 48 (“[T]he deprivation of due process and arbitrary
treatment that my mother and her neighbors’ experience results from Black
Detroiters’ lack of the requisite personhood/citizenship status for contractual
capacity with their local government.”).
286. See id.
287. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (explaining how an
imbalance of power between a contract’s parties can create a contract of
adhesion). Such a contract may be void, as per the doctrine of
unconscionability. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no
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any say as to whether or not they continue to subsidize the cost
of water delivery to the suburbs via the leasing agreements in
place with the GLWA.288 The City of Detroit’s decision to imperil
the health and, indeed, the lives of Detroiters by depriving them
of water for years is also per se demonstrative of the
government’s posture that it has no duty of care to Detroiters
and is not in privity to them.289 Thus, Detroiters lack the
capacity to enter into both sociopolitical contracts and
meaningful and fair commercial contracts with the City of
Detroit with respect to water delivery.290
Of course, it cannot be said that Black people never exercise
their rights to contract. Indeed, Black people in the United
States make purchases with their Amazon Prime memberships,
enter into residential leases, place their homes up for sale, and
go out to eat. It is often the case, however, that Black people’s
attempts to enjoy the right to contract are interrupted,
undermined, or otherwise challenged.291 Therefore, the question
is not whether Black people can ever exercise contractual
capacity, but whether Black people have a legal personhood, and
therefore, a contractual capacity, on which they can always
rely.292 Is Black contracting imbued with, or supported by, the
force of law, or failing that, the law of force?
With respect to the contracts into which Detroiters do enter
into for real property, Detroit’s mortgage foreclosure crisis
demonstrates the City’s intentional lack of regard for the legal
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even
an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the
terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement
are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should
consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that
enforcement should be withheld.
288. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 35–36, 40 (“[T]he City of Detroit
maintains tangible contracts with predominantly white suburbs for the lease
of Detroit’s water, which the suburbs enjoy at pricing subsidized by Detroit’s
predominantly Black, inner-city residents. . . . Detroiters do not bargain with
their local government.”).
289. See id. at 43.
290. See id.
291. See, e.g., Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at 271 (discussing the
historical attacks on Black proprietorship by local governments under Jim
Crow via inflation of property tax assessments).
292. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 42 (describing the scholarship on
race and legal personhood).
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enforceability of the contracts by which Detroiters acquire their
homes.293 For years, as documented by legal scholar Bernadette
Atuahene, “the City of Detroit systematically and illegally
inflated the assessed value of most of its residential properties,
which led to inflated property tax bills unaffordable to many
homeowners.”294 As a result, the Wayne County Treasurer
completed the foreclosure process for one out of every four
properties in Detroit between 2011 and 2015, leading to
“[e]xtraordinary
tax foreclosure rates and extensive
dispossession” of property.295 Like the water shutoff crisis, the
foreclosure crisis was no natural disaster or spontaneous
tragedy, but a devastating catastrophe intentionally designed
by the government to extract capital from Black Detroiters.296
The water and foreclosure crises are related. Pursuant to a
2006 policy adopted by the DWSD, the City of Detroit could tack
unpaid water bills onto homeowners’ property taxes.297 By
Michigan law, Wayne County can, and did, foreclose on homes
with more than three years of unpaid bills.298 Research
conducted in 2016 found that between 12 percent and 26 percent
of the homes foreclosed in Detroit during that five-year period
had water debt attached to them.299 Data reported in 2020 shows

293. See id. at 32 (explaining that Detroit organized the foreclosure crisis
that “disproportionately impacted Black Detroiters and undermined their
enjoyment of property—which was created by unconstitutional tax
assessments and has resulted in thousands of Black Detroiters losing their
homes”).
294. Atuahene, supra note 142, at 107.
295. Id.
296. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 61–62.
297. See Atuahene, supra note 142, at 130 (“When people could not afford
to pay, the delinquent water bill would attach as a lien to the home, causing
further property tax foreclosures and displacement.”).
298. See Sarah Cwiek, Citizen Research Links Detroit Water Shutoffs, Tax
Foreclosures, MICH. RADIO [hereinafter Cwiek, Citizen Research] (Aug. 12,
2016, 6:21 PM), https://perma.cc/A4GV-JXCR; Atuahene & Hodge, supra note
150, at 293 (“Wayne County reimburses Detroit for any property tax revenue
that it fails to collect; in exchange, the county receives the right to collect the
revenues (with penalties and interests) and to confiscate the home if payment
is not forthcoming after three years of delinquency.”).
299. See Cwiek, Citizen Research, supra note 298 (“Citywide, 11,979 of
homes that went to auction had water debt included with property taxes. In
dozens of census tracts, 12–26% of the tax-foreclosed homes fell into that
category.”).
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that between 2010 and 2017, Detroit over-assessed homeowners
in the predominantly Black city to the tune of $600 million.300
Perpetuating the narrative of Black irresponsibility and
rent-seeking has contributed not only to the popular support for
the water shutoff policy, but also to the foreclosures and
dispossession of Black people’s homes—even when they would
have been able to retain their homes but for extraordinary water
bill debt (much of which is inherited with home purchase for
many Detroiters),301 and even when the homeowner’s home was
not associated with water debt at all.302 The narrative that Black
people do not want to pay their bills contributes to the stigma
around foreclosures that has chilled debate amongst Black
Detroiters who do not want their families, friends, and fellow
community members to feel shame at having been subjected to
foreclosure or water disconnection, even when the City of
Detroit is the party at fault.303 Even where proprietors have met
the terms of their legally enforceable contracts for real property,
the state has intervened in those private contracts, deciding not
to recognize their legal validity and effectively engaging in
forcible land expropriation without compensation.304 All the
while, to justify these land seizures, the government relies on
private methods of remedy for breach—the foreclosure
process—which requires that the government characterize their

300. See Aaron Mondry, New Report Shows Detroit’s Tax Foreclosure
Crisis Was Even Worse Than We Thought, CURBED DET. (Jan. 16, 2020, 12:54
PM), perma.cc/63WQ-DG98.
301. For example, Professor Atuahene recounted a conversation she had
with a former Detroit City Council member, who blamed failure of
homeowners to file property tax assessment appeals on “Black folks,” believing
that they “do not read.” Atuahene, supra note 142, at 142.
302. See Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal
Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 9
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 847, 855 (2019) (noting that most home purchases in
Detroit occur through land contracts, which are poorly regulated and often
result in purchasers discovering delinquent tax debt attached to the property
only after the purchase is completed).
303. See Hackman, supra note 258 (“Some feel tarred by a general notion
of shame and culpability for not being able to meet such a bare necessity as
water.”).
304. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 43 (“Black people cannot expect
the racial state to respect their tangible and commercial contracts for
ownership or possession of real or personal property, including their common
water supply.”).
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illegal seizures of real property as the rightful remedying of a
breach by the Black proprietor.305
As the extent of the housing foreclosure scandal has become
apparent, the city has—as with the water scandal—continued
to deny responsibility for its wrongful actions and preferred
instead to lay blame on the dispossessed homeowners:
Some activists and politicians, including City Council
President Pro Tem Mary Sheffield, are weighing retroactive
options like financial restitution for those affected in cash
payments, zero-interest home-repair loans, or free Detroit
Land Bank homes.
But Mayor Mike Duggan seems less willing to consider these
options. “If you’re assessed too much, there’s a whole series
of measures that you can take and a lot of people took
advantage of those measures,” he said in an interview on the
podcast Reveal. “I don’t know how you go back on past years
where people did’’t avail themselves of the rights. What
we’re trying to do is fix it going forward.”306

The narrative of the Black rent-seeker is particularly
manipulative, given that, in both the cases of Detroit’s water
bills and the foreclosure scandal, actual rent-seeking by the
predominantly white surrounding suburbs were a major
contributing factor to the crises—from Detroit’s subsidy of
suburban water,307 to Wayne County’s dire fiscal straits, and its
need for the revenue from foreclosures of Detroit’s real
property.308 In Detroit, decades of racial resentment regarding
Black proprietorship in and governance of Detroit continue to
305. See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at 265.
306. Mondry, supra note 300; see Atuahene & Berry, supra note 302, at
865
When, however, Mayor Duggan was asked what his administration
planned to do to compensate Detroit residents for assessments that
were, for years, in violation of the Michigan Constitution, he said
that while it is unfortunate that this occurred, all Detroit residents
had an opportunity to appeal their assessments and rectify the
situation, so the city is not liable for any damages.
307. See Sabourin, supra note 223, at 313–14.
308. See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at 294 (“Wayne County has
been using the [Delinquent Tax Revolving] Fund to fill its chronic budget
shortfalls and to recover from its recent financial emergency. Consequently,
the financially distressed county has come to rely on property tax foreclosures
in Detroit to stay afloat.”).
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manifest in concerted efforts to destabilize the city while
literally profiting off its resources and camouflaging the scheme
in a haze of anti-Black rhetoric and politics.309 This dynamic
does more than provide a reminder of the brutality of the terms
of whiteness; it also offers demonstrable evidence of the
relationship between private contracting and social contracting
in supporting the preservation and renegotiation of white
supremacy.
2.

Black Proprietorship as Tenancy

The City of Detroit’s systematic deprivation of Black
Detroiters of water and real property provides empirical
evidence for the argument that Black proprietorship is not
supported or protected by the state.310 Indeed, the extractive
predation on Black proprietors by the City of Detroit and Wayne
County illustrates that the state systematically resists and
undermines Black proprietorship and contracting.311 Scholars
and Black advocates have made claims on record widely
suspected within Detroit’s Black communities—that the water
shutoff policy and the property tax over-assessments are
strategic means by the City of Detroit to force Black Detroiters
out of the city in support of the city’s plans for gentrification.312
The Racial Contract cannot abide Black proprietorship and
governance. Whiteness is only valuable property when it is
exclusive and exclusionary, and it is only exclusive and

309. See Quizar, supra note 243, at 435 (describing the racialized discourse
surrounding the water shutoffs).
310. See Atuahene, supra note 142, at 112–15 (detailing the empirical
study of Detroit’s tax assessments); Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at
270–71 (providing data pointing to the racially discriminatory effects of the
assessments); Atuahene & Berry, supra note 302, at 877–81 (describing the
data and regression results that show that “thousands of Detroit home
owners—mostly African-Americans—have lost their property due to
unconstitutional taxation and subsequent foreclosure”).
311. See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 150, at 270–71
(“[U]nconstitutional assessments in Detroit are part of a long and sordid
history of racially discriminatory property tax administration in the United
States.”).
312. See Hackman, supra note 258 (discussing Professor Peter Hammer’s
view that the city shuts off water “implicitly hoping people will move”
characterizing the water shutoffs as a strategic way for the government to get
Black people to leave the city).
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exclusionary when it maintains a monopoly on enjoyment—and
legal protection—of the rights to contract and property.313
Consequently, Black people are wholly dependent upon the
whims of the landlords and their deputized enforcement agents.
They may be removed from property at any time, via
displacement, containment, or elimination—possibly meeting
the fates that awaited Breonna Taylor,314 Atatiana Jefferson,315
or Botham Jean,316 who were at home, engaged in a mundane
activity or asleep when the police shot them to death; or
attacked, like Vauhxx Booker317 or Christian Cooper,318 for their
presence thereupon by white citizens harnessing their lay
policing authority. The law says that one’s home is one’s
castle.319 The Racial Contract says that Black people have no
home and cannot be at home in the United States.

313. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 41 (“A primary goal of the racial
contract is to create a stark economic domination by white people . . . .”).
314. See Amina Elahi, ‘Sleeping While Black’: Louisville Police Kill
Unarmed
Black
Woman,
NPR
(May
13,
2020,
6:33
PM),
https://perma.cc/HFJ5-7BB4.
315. See What We Know About the Fort Worth Police Shooting of Atatiana
Jefferson, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/V2R6-ST3J (last
updated Oct. 24, 2019).
316. See Erik Ortiz & Alex Johnson, Amber Guyger Sentenced to 10 years
for Murdering Neighbor Botham Jean, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2019, 10:02 AM),
https://perma.cc/8S56-XS9U (last updated Oct. 3, 2019, 12:53 AM).
317. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
318. In a now-infamous incident, a white woman named Amy Cooper
threatened to call the police on a Black man by the name of Christian Cooper,
informing Mr. Cooper that she was going to tell the police that he was Black
and threatening her life even though she knew that he had not attacked her,
knowing that making such a claim might cause Mr. Cooper to be detained,
imprisoned, physically harmed, or killed based on their respective races and
genders. Ms. Cooper took these actions because she objected to Mr. Cooper
telling her to leash her dog in the section of New York City’s Central Park
called the Ramble, where pets are required to be leashed. See Sarah Maslin
Nir, How 2 Lives Collided in Central Park, Rattling the Nation, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/9FCD-ZPD4 (last updated Oct. 14, 2020);
Sarah Maslin Nir, White Woman Is Fired After Calling Police on Black Man in
Central Park, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/4732-XRJE (last
updated Feb. 16, 2021).
319. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (“The maxim
that ‘every man’s house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional
law . . . .”).
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B. Detroit vs. Flint: A Tale of Two Cities
On August 20, 2020, the State of Michigan announced that
it had reached a settlement agreement in the amount of $600
million for the survivors of the Flint water scandal.320 Once
divided amongst the tens of thousands of victims likely eligible
to receive awards, the individual awards will likely only amount
to a few thousand dollars each.321 Private claims against private
companies involved in the debacle and public officials, including
former Michigan governor Rick Snyder, will continue.322 The
state’s attorney general, Dana Nessel, notably dropped all
criminal charges against Flint officials in 2019 and restarted a
criminal investigation, ultimately indicting former Governor
Rick Snyder and eight other former officials on forty-one
criminal counts in early 2021.323
The contrasting postures of the State of Michigan to the
cities of Flint and Detroit regarding their respective water
scandals may provide helpful insights into how social
contracting shapes the relationship and duties of governments
towards their citizens. I contend that the State of Michigan has
acknowledged that it is in privity with the people of Flint and
currently in the process of recognizing the residents of Flint as
citizens and members of the body politic, with whom the state
has breached its social contract. However, I also acknowledge
the continued and competing presence of the effects of racial
contracting in Flint, which have manifested in the form of water

320. See Julie Bosman, Michigan to Pay $600 Million to Victims of Flint
Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/8MY4-32HE (last
updated July 29, 2021).
321. See Paul Eegan, Michigan to Pay $600M in Flint Water Crisis
Settlement; Victim Compensation Fund Created, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2020,
11:24 AM), https://perma.cc/D8AA-5RAZ (“Flint resident Nayyirah Shariff,
director of the grassroots group Flint Rising, called the settlement
‘disappointing’ and ‘not at all satisfactory.’ ‘I have seizures now, and because
I’m an adult, I wouldn’t probably get even $6,000,’ Shariff said.”).
322. See Bosman, supra note 320.
323. Id. Nessel indicted nine former officials in early 2021. Brakkton
Booker, Ex-Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder And 8 Others Criminally Charged in
Flint Water Crisis, NPR (Jan. 14, 2021, 6:20 PM), https://perma.cc/5WH8DAE6; Ken Haddad, Flint Water Crisis Investigation: Here’s Who Was
Charged, CLICK-ON-DETROIT, (Jan. 14, 2021, 3:26 PM), https://perma.cc/TN7T89JV.
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shutoffs that took place even after the Flint water scandal had
been uncovered.324
1.

Toward a Theory of a Breached Social Contract?

The Flint settlements offer the opportunity to propose a
counter-theory to the theory of Black exclusion from social
contracting, and thus, from the state. The State of Michigan’s
recognition of the unlawful harms to the people of Flint suggests
a recognition of Flint residents’ personhood and citizenship, and
therefore their rightful property interest in clean, safe water. 325
Has the state not simply breached the terms of its social contract
vis-à-vis Black people in America?
Despite an arguably paltry settlement amount, the fact that
a settlement has been reached and that a criminal investigation
into the water crisis and subsequent coverup is taking place
draws a stark contrast to the governmental responses to the
Detroit water crisis. The criminal investigation and the civil
settlement acknowledge a contractual relationship between
Flint residents and the City of Flint and the State of
Michigan.326 The settlement amount functions as a remedy for a
contractual breach.327
Conversely, is it unlikely that the water scandal could have
happened, and over the course of such a long period of time, were
Flint not so heavily populated by Black people. Moreover, the
324. See Zahra Ahmad, Flint City Council Votes to Eliminate $75 Water
Shut Off Fee, MLIVE (Nov. 29, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://perma.cc/LC74-SCLL
(“There were 7,615 residences where water was shut off due to nonpayment in
the fiscal year 2018, according to Flint’s Director of Public Works Rob Bincsik.
There was $571,350 in revenue generated from terminating water service for
nonpayment of water bills, according to Bincsik.”); Anthony Baxter, Opinion,
Flint Residents are Being Punished for Not Paying for Poisoned Water,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://perma.cc/LY7E-PNMW (discussing
Flint’s disconnection of water supply to victims of the Flint water scandal for
nonpayment of water bills).
325. See Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Gov. Rick Snyder of Michigan
Apologizes in Flint Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://perma.cc/Q8HQ-HBSK.
326. See Rhea Suh, A Major Step Forward in the Flint Water Crisis, NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Mar. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/M5W4-55KV (discussing
the Flint settlement).
327. See id. (noting that the settlement “guarantees that the state kicks in
$67 million to help fix mistakes” and “extensive drinking water—testing
programs far beyond what is required by the law”).
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length of time it has taken for the smallest level of
accountability to arrive is an indicator of the extent to which
even severe crimes and violations perpetuated by the state
against Black people are still largely regarded as little more
than negative externalities. Despite attempts to bring justice to
the people of Flint, it is clear that whiteness is still the law of
the land, and a key ingredient of commercial and social
contracting authority in the State of Michigan.
In addition to delivering poisoned water to Flint residents,
the City of Flint has demanded that Flint residents pay for the
poisoned water.328 Like Detroit, many Flint residents are
impoverished and would not have been able to pay their water
bills under any circumstances.329 Moreover, demanding
payment for water that had already been found to be poisoned
demonstrates the relentlessness and brutality of racial
contracting and its accompanying politics of racialized property
extraction.330 As of 2018, close to one hundred Flint homes were
being subjected to water disconnections by the City of Flint per
day, including in the cold of winter.331 Among the residents
whose water was shut off were those who had already become ill
from the poisoned water.332
The Detroit and Flint water scandals are related, and both
are directly rooted in “white flight”—the refusal of white
residents to share territory or government with Black
people—from both cities, which created water affordability
crises. The Flint water crisis was caused when Flint officials
decided to change its water source from the DWSD to save

328. See Baxter, supra note 324.
See Poverty in Flint, Michigan, WELFARE INFO (2017),
329.
https://perma.cc/47FV-H9BM (“One out of every 2.4 residents of Flint lives in
poverty.”).
330. See Baxter, supra note 324 (discussing a resident of Flint who refuses
to “pay for poison”).
331. See id. (“Up to 90 homes a day are being shut off. And it’s still
winter.”).
332. See id.; Atuahene, supra note 142, at 122 (noting that white
Detroiters refused to share territory with Black Detroiters, resisting efforts at
integration with violent means, and fleeing the City with their social and
financial capital when efforts to keep Black people out of white neighborhoods
failed).
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money in 2012 and 2013.333 Doing so caused rates to increase in
Detroit, which in turn made Detroiters unable to pay their
steadily increasing water bills.334 Flint officials bought into the
anti-Black narrative that Detroit, which provided some of the
best quality water in the United States, was cheating them, and
the officials decided to build their own pipeline to the
Karegnondi Water Authority.335
In more recent years, after the City of Flint restored its
relationship with the GLWA (and began once again to source its
water from Detroit), the City has reversed some of its most
onerous billing policies and has acknowledged a need to be a
“compassionate” city with respect to water service and
delivery.336 Like Detroit, Flint has suspended its water shutoff
policy.337 Unlike Detroit, Flint has made the decision to cover
the increased cost of water from the rise in rates approved by
the GLWA and not pass those increased costs along to Flint

333. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 59 (“[T]he Flint water crisis was
caused when Flint official decided to change the City’s water source from
DWSD in 2013 to the Karegnondi Water authority . . . .”); Quizar, supra note
239, at 430–31 (describing the context and cause of the mass water shut off).
See generally CLARK, supra note 251.
334. See CLARK, supra note 251, at 15–17 (describing the events leading to
the change in the Flint water source, and some of its financial implications).
335. See Kornberg, supra note 243, at 275 (“[S]uburban charges against
the water department administration contributed to characterizations of the
City of Detroit as administratively incompetent, discriminatory—and
ultimately criminal and corrupt. White suburban politicians thus drew on
existing racial stereotypes to deflect their responsibility . . . .”); Quizar, supra
note 239, at 435–38 (detailing the reliance on anti-Black stereotypes by Detroit
officials to advance a narrative in Detroit that Detroiters could pay their water
bills but chose not to); CLARK, supra note 251, at 15 (describing how the switch
to the Karegnondi Water Authority came about).
336. See Steve Carmody, Flint Won’t Charge Residents for Previously
Unmetered Water Use, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 8, 2020, 9:57 AM),
https://perma.cc/2K96-M6AN.
337. Flint Continues Ban on Water Shutoffs After State Order Expires,
ABC12 NEWS (Mar. 31, 2021, 7:32 PM), https://perma.cc/H9DN-M4GK.
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residents.338 Detroit could do the same but so far chosen
otherwise, hiking water rates for Detroiters in 2021.339
2.

Social Contracting, Tort, and Criminal Law

Whether or not the State of Michigan is acknowledging the
breach of an inclusive social contract with respect to the Flint
residents whose water was poisoned, or is instead
acknowledging the existence, salience, and impact of the Racial
Contract on the victims of the Flint water scandal, the
acknowledgment of the wrongs done to the people of Flint is a
potential step toward justice for them. The discussion of the
camouflaging of human rights abuses by governments in private
ordering uses contract theory as a meaningful prism of analysis,
but the use of contract theory should also be regarded as a point
of departure for scholars and advocates who are also interested
in the ways the law can effectuate racial justice and reparatory
outcomes for race-based human rights violations.340 Contract
theory is extremely useful for identifying the machinery of
structural and institutional oppression, as well as for
identifying governments’ cost-benefit analyses, which provide
insight into whether or not government-sanctioned human
rights abuses are the results of error and incompetence, or of
intentional actions and policies with foreknowledge of the
human cost of its decision-making.341

338. See Zahra Ahmad, Water Rates Go Up in Flint, but Residents Won’t
Pay More, MLIVE (June 19, 2019, 1:29 PM) https://perma.cc/EQ39-E5B5 (last
updated June 19, 2019, 2:06 PM) (“The city’s rate . . . will increase . . . . City
officials stated there will not be an increase in consumer water rates,
however.”).
339. See James David Dickson, Price Hikes for Metro Detroit Water Bills to
Kick in July 1, DET. NEWS (June 29, 2021, 10:11 AM), https://perma.cc/HHT2DWNP (noting that rates are set to increase by more than 1.5 percent for water
and decrease by 0.6 percent for wastewater).
340. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 40
Contract theory provides a valuable prism of analysis for scholars
seeking to understand the predatory city . . . . [and] provides
insight into the interests of the bargaining parties, and how they
negotiate and maintain sociopolitical orders, as it also reveals the
presence of intolerable cost and inefficiencies resulting from the
bargained-for agreements.
341. Id.
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The State of Michigan has taken a step further with respect
to the Flint water scandal. It has recognized the commission of
tortious harm against Flint residents and the breach of a duty
owed to the people of Flint by the State of Michigan.342 The civil
settlement can be regarded as a remedy for the breach of
contractual duties owed by a government in privity with all of
its citizens, as well as remedy for the breach of the government’s
duty of care. The acknowledgement of civil liability by the State
of Michigan to Flint residents also opens the door to analysis of
the government’s duties using criminal law. Future work on
racial contracting will move beyond contract theory to center the
application of tort and criminal law as means of reparative
justice for race-based human rights abuses committed by the
government that are not easily reached by extant
antidiscrimination law.
C. Race, Contract, and the Courts: Comcast Corp. v. National
Association of African-American Media
How, then, should readers understand the reliance of a
large proportion of the American population on the formal
revocation of white supremacy in the law? How does one explain
such Black luminaries as Barack Obama, Oprah Winfrey,
Beyoncé, Kamala Harris, Clarence Thomas, and LeBron James?
Critics of this Article’s central thesis may claim that the period
of Reconstruction was a definitive rescission of the nation’s
founding racial contract, with the Civil Rights Act of 1866
establishing a new antiracist social contract.343 After all, Black
342. Whether an action sounds in tort or contract is often unclear, as both
tort and contract law involve breaches of duties. See John G. Shram, Contract
Law—The Collision of Tort and Contract Law: Validity and Enforceability of
Exculpatory Clauses in Arkansas. Jordan v. Diamond Equipment, 2005 WL
984513 (2005), 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 279 (2006)
[I]n some situations the line separating contracts from torts
is . . . . an uncertain, and at times, confusing area shaded in
gray . . . . The issue at the intersection of contract and tort law is
whether such a contract remains enforceable under contract law, or
whether the contract violates tort law and is therefore void as
against public policy.
343. See The Civil Rights Bill of 1866, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://perma.cc/644A-HRW2 (highlighting various features of the Civil Rights
Act, including the grant of full and equal benefits to all citizens, and the grant
of citizenship to all persons born in America, except for American Indians).
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Americans do have the formal legal right to engage in
commercial contracting for goods, services, and property; many
Black American adults do have the right to vote and may also
be elected to hold public office; and, as a formal and official
matter, Black people may live in the same neighborhoods and
attend the same schools as white people.344
To such critics I offer, as rebuttal and in addition to the case
studies I present in Part III, Atatiana Jefferson,345 Breonna
Taylor,346 and the efforts of the GOP to invalidate the votes cast
by African-American voters in Detroit, Philadelphia, and
Atlanta after the November 2020 Presidential election.347 I offer,
as additional rebuttal, the Black Americans who will
disproportionately face eviction and foreclosure due to the
economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the refusal of
the federal government to offer them meaningful assistance to
keep them in their homes.348 Despite the notable achievements
of many, there is no Black American who can rely on a right to
due process in the United States—including the right of
authority over and within the property they possess.349 Those
Black persons in America who do assert their rights to contract
and proprietorship do so in breach of the social contract, and
such
breaches—when
they
are
perceived
to
be
excessive—constitute what Locke considered to be the failure of
the state and trigger rebellion among the contracting parties.350
344. See id. (“The legislation granted all citizens ‘full and equal benefits of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.’”).
345. See What We Know About the Fort Worth Police Shooting of Atatiana
Jefferson, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/JRR7-XHFB (last
updated Oct. 24, 2019).
346. See Oppel, supra note 228.
347. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
348. See Yung Chun & Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Housing Inequality Gets
Worse as the COVID-19 Pandemic Is Prolonged, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 18,
2020), https://perma.cc/XW9D-XLHE (“[D]ata from our recent survey indicates
that the impact of COVID-19 on homeowners not only still exists, but it has
significantly worsened, especially among Black and Hispanic households and
young adults.”).
349. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 45 (“Despite formal guarantees
to the contrary, [Black Detroiters] had no right to expect dues process,
responsive or competent government, dignity, decency or the basic ability to
sustain our lives through consumption of water.”).
350. See John O’Toole, The Right of Revolution: An Analysis of John Locke
and Thomas Hobbes’s Social Contract Theories (May 2011) (B.A. thesis,
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The United States Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling in
Comcast
Corp.
v.
National
Association
of
African-American-Owned Media351 stands as evidence that: the
terms of whiteness are still in force; antidiscrimination law
persistently fails to avail the rights of Black people, including
those seeking to protest the denial of their rights to enjoy
contract and property; and that the laws, and the courts
enforcing them, actually affirmatively sustain the terms of
whiteness by using the law as both a mirage of remedy and a
barrier to remedy for Black people seeking to assert their rights
to commercial and social contract.352
Byron Allen, a Black Detroit-born and Los Angeles-bred
standup comedian-turned-media executive, and pertinently, the
Chairman and CEO of Entertainment Studios, brought a $20
billion suit against Comcast Corporation.353 Allen brought the
suit pursuant to § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, alleging
that Comcast refused to enter into contract with Entertainment
Studios due to anti-Black racial discrimination.354 Comcast
refuted Allen’s allegations, claiming that the failure to enter
into contract after years of negotiations was “an ordinary
business grievance masquerading as a racial discrimination
claim,”355 though Comcast repeatedly refused to hold meetings
or entertain serious negotiations concerning a carriage contract,
and representatives had directed derogatory, anti-Black
language at Black protesters protesting against Comcast. The
Central District of California dismissed Allen’s suit without
prejudice in August 2015, allowing Allen to file amended claims,
Boston University), https://perma.cc/4RML-BF8E (PDF) (“[I]f the sovereign
rebels against the original social contract, he returns the people to a state of
war. He forfeits his power over them, and they can then ‘revolt’ . . . .”).
351. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
352. See id. at 1011 (“A § 1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains
constant over the life of the lawsuit.”).
353. Id. at 1013; see Tucker Higgins, Comcast Poised to Beat $20 Billion
Race Discrimination Case at Supreme Court, CNBC (Nov. 13, 2019, 11:33 AM),
https://perma.cc/ZT3J-2PYQ.
354. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
355. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
by Defendants at *9, Nat’l Ass’n of African-American Media v. Comcast Corp.,
No. 2:15-cv-01239-TJH-MAN (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015), 2015 U.S. Dist. Ct.
Motions LEXIS 10.
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before entering final judgment for Comcast.356 Allen appealed
the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
rejected Comcast’s claim that it had editorial discretion to select
among the channels it carried, overturning the district court’s
dismissal.357 The Supreme Court granted Comcast a writ of
certiorari, for which Comcast petitioned, in June 2019.358
Comcast argued that Allen needed to demonstrate that race was
the but-for reason, or the sole deciding factor, for why Comcast
did not enter into contract with Entertainment Networks, as
opposed to the “motivating factor” analysis upon which the
Ninth Circuit had relied.359 On March 23, 2020, the Supreme
Court sided with Comcast in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, in
which all justices joined except for Justice Ginsburg, who wrote
a separate opinion that concurred in part and joined in the
judgment.360
The decision was a blow to mixed-motive suits, which allow
plaintiffs to successfully establish racial discrimination if they
can demonstrate that a respondent acted with a combination of
reasons for an adverse action, some of which were unlawful.361
The Supreme Court previously ruled that victims of
employment discrimination might prevail in actions using the
mixed-motive rule in its 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins362
decision, but as the Court has become decidedly more
conservative, it ruled against expanding the use of the
mixed-motive role beyond the employment context on two

356. See Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., CV
15-o-1239 TJH (MANx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104012, at *1, *5 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 15, 2015).
357. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 743 F. App’x
106, 107 (9th Cir. 2018).
358. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 139 S. Ct.
2693, 2694 (2019).
359. See Comcast, 915 F.3d at 623 (“Charter argues that the Supreme
Court’s decision in two discrimination cases requires us to apply a but-for
causation standard to § 1981 claims.”).
360. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1019–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part).
361. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (“An
employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering
a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not
motivate it at the time of the decision.”).
362. See id. at 258 (finding in favor of the plaintiff in an antidiscrimination
case under the mixed-motive doctrine).
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occasions363 before ruling against Allen.364 Remarkably, the
Court’s liberal wing sided with the conservative justices, with
Justice Ginsburg indicating that she joined with her colleagues’
judgment—despite her reservations concerning the but-for test,
which she found “ill suited to discrimination cases and
inconsistent with tort principles”365—because of stare decisis.366
Commentators have noted that the liberal justices have often
complained of the conservative justices’ lack of respect for
precedent, as they more frequently overrule past decisions of the
Court, and that the liberal justices appear to have sacrificed the
mixed-motive rule in the hopes of perhaps preserving other
antidiscrimination protections against conservative overrule in
the future.367
In an ironic end to Allen’s suit, Allen and Comcast reached
an out-of-court settlement agreement and agreed to a carriage
contract after the Supreme Court’s decision to grant Comcast’s
motion to dismiss.368 Allen’s suit demonstrates just how difficult
it is for plaintiffs to prevail in racial discrimination suits, even
using laws purportedly enacted to eradicate racial
discrimination and provide legal remedy to those victimized
thereby.369 Indeed, racial discrimination may occur entirely
subconsciously and may only be evidenced by the sort of
363. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013)
(holding that retaliation claims brought under Title VII must be proven using
the but-for causation standard); Jack Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167, 176 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim
under the ADEA must prove that claim using the but-for causation standard).
364. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1019 (2020).
365. See id. at 1019–20 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part).
366. See id. at 1020 n.1 (“I recognize, however, that our precedent now
establishes this form of causation as a ‘default rul[e]’ in the present context.”).
367. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Handed Down a Unanimous
Decision That Bodes Ill for the Future of Civil Rights, VOX (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://perma.cc/8Q7H-HP76
The court’s liberal minority . . . finds itself shouting into a void that
the principle of stare decisis is not being respected. . . . The most
likely explanation is that they fear their conservative colleagues
plan to overrule many seminal decisions in the future . . . .
368. See Cynthia Littleton, Byron Allen and Comcast Settle Racial
Discrimination Lawsuit, Set Carriage Deal for 3 Channels, VARIETY (June 11,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/V8XG-R6MX.
369. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
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empirical evidence Allen provided of Comcast’s carriage fees.370
Moreover, few respondents will be unsophisticated enough to
make it clear to a putative plaintiff or court that it is engaging
in racial discrimination specifically, and only, on the basis of the
plaintiff’s race, even where it has done so.371 However, even as
the society better understands systemic, structural, and
institutional forms of racism,372 adjudication in the nation’s
federal courts has actually increasingly undermined
antidiscrimination complainants by relying on formalism and
insurmountably high standards of proof.373 The Comcast ruling
makes the successful establishment of a racial discrimination
claim under § 1981 virtually impossible, which means that
Black people’s formal right to contract is essentially
unsupported by the force of public law.374 In so doing, the courts
continue to give force to the invisible common law of whiteness
while making public presentations of a commitment to racial
equality under the law.375 If the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
meant to mark the execution of a new social contract upholding
principles of antiracism, Comcast demonstrates that such a
370. See Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 915 F.3d
617, 621 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiffs’ amended complaint also included direct
evidence of racial bias. In one instance, Singer allegedly approached an
African-American protest group outside Charter’s headquarters, told them ‘to
get off of welfare,’ and accused them of looking for a ‘handout.’”).
371. See Vincent M. Southerland, The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic
Tools in the Criminal Legal System, 80 MD. L. REV. 487, 542–43 (2021)
(arguing that the companies engaging in racial profiling will be shielded from
equal protection claims by producing public statements that are “racially
benevolent”).
372. See HAMMER, supra note 258, at 1–3. While Professor Hammer’s
paper is proof of the updated knowledge available concerning the nature,
mechanisms, and manifestations of racism, he acknowledges that many
members of the public still maintain that racism can only exist when it is
interpersonal and intentional. See generally id.
373. See Millhiser, supra note 367 (“Comcast . . . extends two prior
decisions that made it harder for some plaintiffs to prevail in federal court.”).
374. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1014–15 (2020) (“[A] plaintiff bears the burden of showing that race was
a but-for cause of its injury. And while the materials the plaintiff can rely on
to show causation may change as a lawsuit progresses from filing to judgment,
the burden itself remains constant.”).
375. See id. at 1014, 1011 (adopting a but-for test, noting that though the
Ninth Circuit did not hold that a § 1981 claim required but-for causation, other
circuits disputed that interpretation).
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contract is illusory at best, and actually provides necessary
cover to the Racial Contract while gaslighting putative and
actual Black plaintiffs into believing that their experiences with
racism and its cost are simply not racist enough.
IV. REVOKING THE RACIAL CONTRACT
Antidiscrimination law has, thus far, largely failed to reach
the abuses described in this Article because under the law,
disparate impact on Black people—empirical proof of harm—is
worth less than explicit proof of racist discriminatory intent.376
The Racial Contract demonstrates the permanent inadequacy of
U.S. antidiscrimination law to reach complex issues of
structural racism or racist, necropolitical schemes of
governments that are sophisticated enough to avoid explicitly
racist reasoning and discourse.377 The ACLU complaint on
behalf of the people of Detroit, for example, is nearly one
hundred pages long.378 It is comprehensive and replete with
empirical data making the case that the shutoffs have
disparately impacted Black people, in support of their state and
federal civil rights claims.379 This may not be sufficient to prove
that the City of Detroit unlawfully abridged the rights of the
Detroiters impacted by the shutoffs. The standards of review are
structured so that even in the face of undeniable evidence of
racist impact, the court may determine the relevant
governmental body had lawful interest in carrying out the water
shutoffs.380
376. See Leong, Enjoyed by White Citizens, supra note 70, at 1467
In the context of the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, the
Court has held that plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent to
prevail. Legal scholars have long criticized the discriminatory
intent requirement, arguing that the requirement does not
capture . . . serious disparities that cannot be traced to a smoking
gun of discriminatory intent.
377. See Jackson Sow, supra note 212, at 30 (“The Declaration of
Independence states that all men are created equal; the racial contract limits
this to white men with property.”).
378. See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 15.
379. See id. ¶¶ 1–23 (stating the Brookings Institute found that ninety
percent of the city’s zip codes with the highest number of confirmed COVID-19
cases were populations that were at least 80 percent Black).
380. See id. ¶¶ 260–64 (negating Detroit’s claim that its actions furthered
a legitimate government interest).
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Contract theory is a helpful prism through which American
scholars can evaluate the gaps between the standards of care
that the American government at the federal, state, and local
levels owes the American citizenry and the lack of care it
delivers to Black and Indigenous people. Contract theory is more
helpful in locating the motivations of government to prey on
Black and Indigenous people, extracting resources they enjoy,
possess, and manage, and expropriating them for the benefit of
white individuals, the state, and corporations—all of whom
together form the Racial State. Though lawyers can do little to
change the applicable standards of review in antidiscrimination
actions, they can exploit the social and political momentum
coming from the public’s reaction to the revelations of the terms
of whiteness. Using contract theory as a prism of analysis serves
to measure the harm caused by the state’s expropriation of
Black property and its continued refusal to respect Black
commercial and social contracting authority, for the purposes of
demanding redress and reparation. This Part of the Article
proposes strategies for divestment from whiteness as a means
of sociopolitical organization and revocation of the contract of
whiteness.
A. Interpersonal Social Action
In June 2020, a white woman named Susan, but now known
on social media channels as “Permit Karen,” was captured on
now-viral video harassing her Black neighbors, both of whom
are professors of law, for constructing a patio on their own
property in Montclair, New Jersey.381 Much of the exchange was
emblematic of other publicized confrontations of Black people by
white people who feel that the Black people are enjoying their
rights to contract or property in a way—trespassing upon the
terms of the racial contract—of which the white person does not
approve.382 Susan objected to her neighbors’ construction of a
381. Erik Hawkins, Watch: ‘Permit Karen’ Calls Cops on Neighbors in
Montclair, New Jersey, HEAVY, https://perma.cc/RSB2-D7TJ (last updated
June 30, 2020, 11:38 PM).
382. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Video Shows Black 14-Year-Old Falsely
Accused of Theft in a SoHo Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/76P2-ESRW (last updated Jan. 8, 2021) (reporting a woman
falsely accusing a teenager of taking her phone caught on video by the teen’s
father).
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patio on their own backyard.383 She reportedly trespassed onto
her Black neighbors’ property on a number of occasions to
harass them regarding the same, demanding to know if the
neighbors had a permit for the work and expecting them to
respond to her and otherwise submit to her authority as a white
woman.384 When Susan’s neighbors asked her to leave their
property, Susan decided to call the police and accuse Professor
Hayat of having assaulted her, though he had not touched
her.385 Professor Hayat videotaped the interaction.386
Remarkably, a number of other white neighbors, who were
witnessing the interactions, stepped in to defend the Black
couple and went out of their way to reject Susan’s account of the
interaction.387 In doing so, they completely breached the terms
of whiteness.
Increasingly widespread social discomfort over the
harassment of Black people over their occupancy of property and
their assertions of their rights to engage in contract has led to
sweeping social and legal changes. A legislator in San Francisco
introduced a bill named the Caution Against Racially
Exploitative Non-Emergencies (CAREN) Act on July 8, 2020,388
which would outlaw the racist weaponization of law
enforcement to terrorize or harass people based on their race.389
Similar, but less cleverly named, legislation has been introduced
in other jurisdictions.390 The lesson is clear: persistent and
383. Hawkins, supra note 381.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. The videotape depicts Susan calling the police and making false
allegations. See id.
387. Id.
388. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 9, § 637 (2020) (prohibiting
contacting police to deprive another person of certain rights based on their
“actual or perceived race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, national origin, place of
birth, sex, age, religion, creed, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity,
weight, or height”).
389. The CAREN Act is intended to deter calls to police that are improper
and racially motivated. See Evan Nicole Brown, Will It Take a Clever Acronym
to Stop Racially Motivated 911 Calls?, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/53BH-RBMW.
390. See Alisha Ebrahimji & Amanda Jackson, San Francisco’s ‘CAREN
Act,’ Making Racially Biased 911 Calls Illegal, Is One Step Closer to Becoming
a Law, CNN, https://perma.cc/67NM-RNP4 (last updated Oct. 20, 2020, 11:54
PM).
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intense social agitation, especially by the beneficiaries of
whiteness, is an effective tool in demanding that the racial
contract be replaced with an antiracist social contract.
B. Politics and Possibilities
Politics changes the law more efficiently than the law
changes politics. American law is, as noted by Frances Lee
Ansley, resistant to transformative change, and is resistant by
design to preserve a particular sociopolitical and economic order
commonly known as white supremacy.391 Politics is, however, a
realm within which the terms of whiteness may be rescinded
efficiently and effectively.
Racial contracting is not an activity that is restricted to
people raced as white; however, even as Black people remain
excluded from America’s social contract, nothing prohibits them
from contracting amongst themselves and allies determined to
build a new society with new notions of justice and laws.392 In
fact, the centuries-long assertions by non-white people in the
United States of their rights may be viewed as interference with
the Racial Contract or as the negotiation of an antiracist social
contract amongst a willing antiracist coalition. As progressive
and radical groups have rejected the idea that America is a just
and fair society, antiracist racial contracting has, like the Racial
Contract, become increasingly visible and potent.
Antiracist racial contracting can take a number of forms but
must always involve conscious resistance to white supremacy
through contracting and proprietorship, in order to properly
assert Black personhood and citizenship.393 Organized
391. See Ansley, supra note 86, at 997, 1031 (characterizing American law
as anti-redistributionist and determining that an end to racism will require
grassroots, multiracial social action, or “participation and involvement of
people, black and white, throughout the lower ranks of our society”).
392. See, e.g., Arielle Mitropoulos, Supporting Black Businesses as Means
to Combat Racism Grows in Momentum, ABC NEWS (June 19, 2020, 4:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/ULS4-N8EP (“Supporting black-owned businesses helps not
just the business, but the entire communities at the center of the current
demonstrations.”).
393. See Matt Schrage, Rousseau and Locke on Property and the State,
MATT SCHRAGE (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://perma.cc/BT3X-MXV4. While
Locke associated property rights as natural to humanity, and thus connected
to natural personhood, Rosseau viewed property rights as the creation of the
state and only existing pursuant to social contract. Id. Whether one agrees
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campaigns encouraging people to (sometimes exclusively)
support Black-owned and Indigenous-owned business, for
example, are ways that people—particularly Black and
Indigenous people—have leveraged their enjoyment of the
rights to contract and their rights to acquire and sell property
(in the form of goods and services).394 While some individuals
support these businesses as a way to support Black and
Indigenous entrepreneurs’ participation in the marketplace,
develop community and multigenerational wealth, and
accumulate property and power, others will seek to contract
exclusively with Black or minority-owned businesses as a way
to divest from an American economy premised upon white
supremacy and anti-Black/Indigenous dispossession.
In future work, I look forward to analyzing another
manifestation of antiracist racial contracting: that of Black
organizers and community members who voted to oust the
Trump administration in 2020. By asserting and promoting the
rights of Black people to political proprietorship, Black
community organizers engaged in formidable voter turnout and
election protection campaigns for the sole purpose of defeating
Donald Trump and his explicitly white supremacist platform.395
These Black organizers took a leading role in both assembling a
nationwide, multiracial, and otherwise diverse coalition of
voters, and in galvanizing Black voters to negotiate amongst
with Locke or Rosseau regarding the origin of property rights, it follows that
the protection of the right of Black people to property ownership and
possession is requisite to their natural personhood, political personhood, and
citizenship/privity with the state.
394. See Cortne Bonilla, Black-Owned Businesses Kept Up That Same
Energy. Did You?, REFINERY 29, https://perma.cc/9MPL-8QJX (last updated
Sept. 1, 2020, 9:37 AM) (discussing the significant, but possibly temporary,
uptick in support for Black-owned businesses in the aftermath of George
Floyd’s killing); Gene Demby, Activists Are Pushing for Consumers to Support
Black Businesses. Is it Sustainable?, NPR (June 26, 2020, 4:58 AM),
https://perma.cc/82RH-UQ6K (discussing support of Black businesses by
Black patrons as a longstanding act of resistance via attempts to build
independent community wealth); Mitropoulos, supra note 392 (discussing the
uptick in widespread, multiracial support for Black businesses after George
Floyd’s death).
395. See Astead W. Herndon, Georgia Was a Big Win for Democrats. Black
Women
Did
the
Groundwork.,
N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2020),
https://perma.cc/MF5T-E8FV (last updated Dec. 5, 2020); Charlotte Alter,
How Black Political Organizers Shored Up the Democratic Base, TIME (Sept.
18, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://perma.cc/JM68-PVT7.

WHITENESS AS CONTRACT

1885

themselves for the dismantling of a Trump-fortified Racial
Contract.396
Centering Black contracting may prove helpful in
evaluating antiracist racial contracting as either a subversive
divestment from or interference with racist contracting, or as
racial contract rescission. It may also prove quite useful in
calcifying conceptualization of political engagement—certainly
voting—as contractual negotiation and the exercise of
sociopolitical proprietorship, as opposed to the concept of civic
duty, which characterizes civic engagement as a burden rather
than as an opportunity. Finally, centering Black contracting will
support scholars, advocates, and activists in developing
strategies for dismantling white supremacy via social and
political action—critical tools in the fight for racial justice given
the role that litigation within the current framework plays in
undergirding, rather than undermining, the invisible common
law of white rule.
C. Remedies and Reparations
A principal value of viewing whiteness as contract is the
insight it provides into the operations and machinery of white
supremacy and its benefits and costs.397 Because its raison d’être
is the consolidation and domination of wealth and power, white
racial contracting will continue until it is no longer profitable.
An effective method of revoking the Racial Contract and
dismantling white supremacy is to make the abuse and
exploitation of Black people extremely costly. Constructing in
Black and other non-white people an entitlement to
reliance-based damages under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel creates a legally solvent pathway towards reparatory
justice.
Municipal legislatures are seeking to make the act of using
law enforcement to discriminate against people on the basis of
race a criminal offense. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors,
396. Id.
397. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 182 (noting the worth of
applying contract theory to the social and political foundations of constitutions
because the theory of private contracting provides insights into how
constitutions are “negotiated and maintained”). This Article has used contract
theory as a means of providing insight into the negotiation and maintenance
of the law, and terms, of white supremacy.
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for example, unanimously voted in favor of the CAREN Act as a
way to punish the use of 911 to persecute Black people for being
present in public.398 Similar legislation has been introduced in
Los Angeles, New York City, and Grand Rapids.399 This
legislation undermines the contracting of whiteness in two
major ways: by making the invisible common law that sanctions
the harassment and coercive removal of Black bodies from
public spaces highly visible, and revoking it in formal, public
law; and by attaching costly criminal and civil penalties to such
harassment.400
State and local governments can rescind whiteness in a
number of ways. In the cases of Detroit and Flint, the local
governments have the option of ending the politics of extraction
and exploitation.401 Those cities could tax utilities, for example,
or charge affordable, flat rates for all regional water consumers.
The State of Michigan could also offer grants and subsidies or
discounts for all households previously victimized by water
shutoffs and to all residents with incomes below a certain
threshold. Alternatively, the State could offer tax credits to all
water shutoff survivors, as well as to Flint water scandal
survivors. And finally, the policy of disconnecting water must be
abandoned, as a matter of both human rights and racial
justice.402
Similar measures must be adopted to make victims of
racialized real property dispossessions whole and to address the
ongoing problem of racial discrimination in housing.403
398. See Ebrahimji & Jackson, supra note 390 (reporting the introduction
of the CAREN Act).
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. See supra notes 336–338 and accompanying text (highlighting the
policy changes Flint, Michigan is making with respect to ending the politics of
extraction via water).
402. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that the human
right to water is enshrined in international law); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF
PEOPLES 11–23, 78–81 (1999) (outlining respect for human rights as one of the
eight principles of law). To create Rawls’s desired utopia, it is imperative that
race be centered, confronted, and rectified by governments and by theorists.
See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
403. See Mondry, supra note 300 (“There’s no way to make people whole
again for the money lost in home values and tax bills [from the foreclosure
scandal]. But something must be done.”).
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Meaningful efforts at reparative justice may include tax credits
for Black homeowners, settlements to all Black homeowners
who have lost their properties or have been subjected to
over-assessments by the City of Detroit, mortgage grants and
low home financing rates for all survivors of the water scandals
and mortgage foreclosure scandals, and an end to the practices
of attaching water debt to property taxes and properties (as
opposed to individuals). Any municipality or state genuinely
interested in divesting from predatory policies aimed at
draining life, liberty, and property from Black people for the
sake of white profit can do so; they need only divest from
whiteness and invest in a new, actively antiracist social contract
in which Black and Indigenous interests are centered.
V. CONCLUSION
Analyzing human rights abuses endured by Black people in
the United States through the prism of private ordering is
helpful because such rights do not easily correspond to remedies
for the survivors of these abuses under extant legal frameworks
despite the existence of formal rights and legal protections. The
depths and gravity of these abuses also take on new
conspicuousness and dimension when viewed not just as the
violations of rights, but as material extraction and exploitation.
Importantly, when human rights violations are viewed through
the lens of economic exploitation, cost, and damages, the
discussion of accountability and redress can more easily include
concrete measures for reparative justice.
The racial justice uprisings of 2020 have reminded scholars
and advocates that social movements catalyze legal and political
change with much more efficiency and greater impact than legal
change catalyzes social and political change. The uprisings have
caused everyday people who are raced as white—to whom the
economic, social, and political benefits of whiteness accrue
daily—to acknowledge that they are beneficiaries of an illicit
and unjust racist contract, even if they were never signatories,
and to consider joining Black and Indigenous people in
demanding the contract’s immediate rescission.
In her testimonial to The Racial Contract, Jennifer
Hochschild writes, “Mills has made it especially clear how
whites dominate people of color, even (or especially) when they
have no such intention” before noting “[h]e asks whites not to
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feel guilty, but rather to do something much more difficult—
understand and take responsibility for a structure they did not
create but still benefit from.”404 This Article does not ask white
people not to feel guilty. It is my hope that white readers will
recognize that human rights abuses against Black people are
occurring in real time, often captured on iPhones and social
media feeds, and thus in their presence.
This Article calls upon white people to recognize their
individual and collective guilt and privilege. It exhorts them to
confront their roles as either signatories to or beneficiaries of an
ongoing series of negotiations over the benefits and spoils of
white supremacy, for which many members of the white body
politic will steal and kill to defend and uphold. In future
projects, I look forward to discussing the embrace of white guilt
as a prevention and cure for racism and racist atrocity. For now,
however, this Article concludes with a call for white people to
join communities of color in divesting from whiteness and
denouncing the contracting of whiteness as unconscionable.
This type of social action, combined by reparative policy changes
restoring and protecting the rights of contracting and
proprietorship to Black people, offers a meaningful path toward
political personhood, reliable and equal protection of the law,
and full enjoyment of American citizenship.

404. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT iii (2014) (quoting
Jennifer Hoschchild).

